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Abstract
We propose a theory based on the firm’s hiring behavior that rationalizes the ob-
served decline of callback rates for an interview, exit rates, and reemployment wages
over unemployment duration. We build a directed search model with symmetric in-
complete information on worker types and non-sequential search by firms. Sorting due
to firms’ testing of applicants in the past makes expected productivity fall with unem-
ployment duration, which induces firms to rank applicants by duration. In equilibrium
callback and exit rates both fall with duration. In our numerical exercise using US
data we show that our model can replicate quite well the observed falling patterns,
and that the effects of the firm’s ranking decision can be sizable.
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It is well documented that exit rates from unemployment strongly fall with unemployment
duration. Most explanations of this pattern have focused on the supply side, assigning a very
limited role to firms. A primary reason for this has been the scarcity of empirical evidence
about the hiring process.1 However, recent field experiments provide strong indication that
firms make use of the information that unemployment duration conveys for their recruiting
decisions. By submitting applications of fictitious workers to job postings, Oberholzer-Gee
(2008), Kroft, Lange, and Notowidigdo (2013) and Eriksson and Rooth (2014) find that the
rate at which an applicant is called back for an interview (i.e. the callback rate) significantly
declines with unemployment duration.
When unemployment duration is informative about workers’ expected productivity and
firms meet several applicants at once, recruiting firms have incentives to rank applicants
by duration when calling them for interviews. Note, however, that the firm’s ranking re-
duces the chances to fill a vacancy as those job-seekers who anticipate that they will be
discriminated against will apply somewhere else unless wages compensate for the additional
unemployment risk. Thus, the ranking of candidates that firms choose will depend on both
expected productivity and wages.
In this paper, we analyze the firm’s optimal hiring decisions, and how these decisions
determine the duration dynamics of callback rates for an interview, exit rates from unem-
ployment and reemployment wages. We show that firms rank applicants by unemployment
duration in equilibrium, which endogenizes the ranking mechanism first introduced by Blan-
chard and Diamond (1994). We also show that our theory rationalizes the observed severe
fall of callback and exit rates as well as the mild decline of wages over duration. Furthermore,
we find that the ranking margin is crucial for these results, and that its quantitative effects
can be sizable.
To explicitly model the ranking strategies of employers, we set up a directed search
model of the labor market with two key ingredients. First, skilled workers are both more
productive and more likely to be suitable for any job than the unskilled, but information
about workers’ type is symmetric and incomplete. Second, firms can screen out unsuitable
applicants, and can discriminate among observationally different workers both through wages
and by deciding on a ranking of the candidates to be tested.
In our model, unobserved heterogeneity together with the firms’ testing in the past leads
to sorting as in the seminal paper by Lockwood (1991). In effect, unemployment duration
1See Oyer and Schaefer (2011) for a discussion.
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conveys information about expected productivity because skilled workers leave the unem-
ployment pool faster. Firms set wages to solve the trade-off spelled out above between
attracting more applicants and testing them according to a chosen ranking. Notice that if
firms committed to a single wage, as in Lang, Manove, and Dickens (2005) and Peters (2010),
the ranking by unemployment duration would be the obvious optimal decision ex-post, but
firms would attract fewer applicants. In contrast, we allow firms to commit to a menu of
wages, potentially contingent on expected productivity. Equilibrium wages pay a share of
worker’s productivity net of the value of the next best candidate, thereby making the most
productive applicants the most profitable ones as well as ensuring that all workers obtain
their market value when queueing for the job. As a result, the labor market is non-segmented
in equilibrium because firms find it optimal to attract workers of all durations to increase
their job-filling rate and to save on wages as the presence of more competitors reduces the
marginal value of any given worker.
Why do exit rates fall as unemployment duration increases? First, because applicants
are tested only if no worker with shorter duration either applied for the job or was found
to be suitable, thereby leading callback rates for an interview to fall with duration. Second,
exit rates also fall due to sorting as it more and more reduces the probability of succeeding
at the test.2
We then investigate the effects of the firm’s ranking decision by comparing to an alter-
native economy that only differs from the benchmark in that firms are forced to test all
applicants. We refer to it as the NR economy. In this alternative setting, callback rates
are constant in duration by assumption, and, although firms can still discriminate among
observationally different workers through wages, the labor market is segmented in equilib-
rium.3 The elimination of the ranking margin makes it too costly for firms to attract all
applicants: the gains from the higher job-filling rates when also attracting workers with
longer unemployment spells are offset by the lower expected productivity per filled vacancy
and the higher wage costs necessary to compensate the more productive workers for their
lower matching rates. When firms can discriminate in favor of the more productive workers
instead, such costs do not exist. Likewise, we find that while in our benchmark economy
2Notice that the declining pattern over unemployment duration hinges on the labor market being non-
segmented in equilibrium. If it were segmented to some degree with different submarkets targeting different
subsets of unemployment duration, then callback rates would exhibit upward jumps when moving from one
submarket to the subsequent one as applicants would go from being ranked last to being ranked first.
3This is in line with the results obtained in Menzio and Shi (2010) with on-the-job directed search and
heterogeneous workers. Furthermore, Lang, Manove, and Dickens (2005) and Peters (2010) show that the
wage margin is also central for the market to be non-segmented by studying an economy in which firms
commit to a single wage but can rank applicants.
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exit rates always fall with duration but wages might be non-monotone, wages in the NR
economy continuously fall and the duration dynamics of exit rates are ambiguous.
We evaluate the quantitative properties of our model to gauge how well it can replicate the
data, and to illustrate the effects of the firms’ ranking decision. We calibrate the model to the
U.S. labor market. We target several moments of the duration distribution of exit rates that
we construct from the Current Population Survey (CPS), whereas no information from wages
and callback rates is used. The simulated data replicates very well the actual distribution of
exit rates. In addition, model wages show a declining pattern over unemployment duration
very close to the actual one we obtain from the CPS. Callback rates also significantly drop
with duration in line with the empirical evidence from the aforementioned field experiments.
Moreover, our numerical exercise suggests that ranking strongly amplifies the fall of exit
rates along duration, even if the degree of ex-ante heterogeneity is very small.
Our main contribution to the macroeconomic literature is to provide a theory that jointly
rationalizes the observed duration patterns of callback rates, exit rates, and wages. As we
briefly discuss below, previous work has primarily focused on mechanisms that theoretically
explain the decline of job-finding rates along unemployment duration, giving little role to
wages and, more generally, to the firms’ hiring behavior. In contrast, our theory is based on
firm’s endogenous ranking induced by sorting, which together with the equilibrium wages
firms commit to ensures a non-segmented labor market.
Our ranking result is a form of rational stigma based on the information conveyed by
the sorting of unemployed workers as time passes. Lockwood (1991) first modeled rational
stigma associated with long-term unemployment as a duration cut-off rule within a random
search framework.4 Two recent pieces in this vein that have a quantitative approach are
Jarosch and Pilossoph (2015), who also study the duration dynamics of callback rates, and
Doppelt (2015). Search is random and wages do not play an allocative role in these papers
since they are derived from a surplus-sharing rule. To gain tractability, firms have all the
bargaining power in Lockwood (1991) and Jarosch and Pilossoph (2015), but thereby making
reemployment wages constant in duration as in the ranking model of Blanchard and Diamond
(1994). In Doppelt (2015), workers learn about their types during both employment and
unemployment spells, and, according to his calibration exercise, his stigma mechanism also
accounts for a sizable part of the decline in exit rates, with equilibrium wages varying non-
monotonically with duration.
We also contribute to the directed search literature that started with Peters (1991) and
4Vishwanath (1989) is an earlier contribution on stigma using a partial equilibrium search model. The
importance of unobserved heterogeneity in the decline of exit rates over duration is well known since the
work of Lancaster (1979) and Heckman and Singer (1984).
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Moen (1997). Within this literature, ranking as a decision of firms has first been modeled in
a static setting by Shi (2002) and Shimer (2005a).5 Their primary focus is on the assignment
of exogenously heterogeneous workers to a distribution of firms. Instead, we investigate the
effects of ranking on the duration dynamics of exit rates and wages when the distribution
of expected productivities is endogenous. Furthermore, and in contrast to their models, we
argue that the equilibrium allocation is not constrained efficient in our setting due to an
intertemporal information externality.
In closely related work, Gonzalez and Shi (2010) analyze an economy with bilateral
meetings, where equally productive workers learn about their matching ability (akin to
our concept of suitability) from their own search. In contrast to our benchmark model,
a segmented labor market arises endogenously because staying unemployed one more period
makes workers search for lower wage jobs, which are easier to obtain. Therefore, reemploy-
ment wages decline with duration in equilibrium, but exit rates need not fall because of
sorting. Flemming (2015) also rationalizes the different sensitivity of exit rates and wages
to unemployment duration in a directed search model with learning by doing.
As the assumption of non-sequential search of firms is key for our results, we now briefly
summarize the empirical evidence in its support. Using Dutch data, van Ours and Ridder
(1992) and Abbring and van Ours (1994) conclude that firms’ search is non-sequential, unlike
workers’ search. Consistent with these findings, van Ommeren and Russo (2009) find that
whether firms’ search is sequential depends on the search method. In particular, firms search
non-sequentially when they use formal methods such as advertising.
Finally, there is a number of theories, complementary to ours, that model a causal effect
of duration on exit rates. Workers may get discouraged if the returns to their search fall
with unemployment duration due to for example skill attrition (Pissarides (1992)). Fewer job
opportunities also arise as unemployment progresses in stock-flow search models (Coles and
Smith (1998)) and models with informational networks deteriorating along unemployment
duration (Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2004)).
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we analyze the benchmark economy and
characterize the equilibrium. Section 3 studies the economy without ranking. In Section 4,
we undertake a numerical exercise. Finally, Section 5 concludes and discusses some central
assumptions of the model. All proofs and data work are relegated to the Appendix.
5Moen (1999) constructs a model of ranking by education showing that human capital investments prior
to matching are undertaken not only to raise future wages, but also employment prospects.
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2 Benchmark Model
This section presents a directed search model of the labor market in which firms may dis-
criminate among applicants in wages and in the hiring decision.
2.1 Environment
Time is discrete and continues forever. There is a unit mass of infinitely lived workers and a
large continuum of identical firms. The mass of new firms is determined by free entry every
period. All agents are risk neutral and discount future payoffs at a common factor β. The
focus of this paper is on the steady-state allocation; hence, time indices are suppressed.
Workers can be either skilled (type h) or unskilled (type `).6 There is a mass µ ∈ (0, 1)
of skilled workers, and 1 − µ of unskilled workers. Worker types differ both by their market
productivity and by their idiosyncratic suitability at any given firm. A type- i job-seeker
turns out to be suitable for the job at hand with probability λi, with i ∈ {`, h}. If a worker
is not suitable for a given job, the match is not productive and the worker is not hired. A
type-i suitable applicant produces yi units of output if hired. We assume that skilled workers
have higher chances of being suitable and perform strictly better at the production stage,
i.e. 0 < λ` < λh ≤ 1 and y` < yh.7
At the beginning of every period, workers can be either employed or unemployed. The
unemployed seek job opportunities and derive utility from home production, b < y`. Let
τ denote their elapsed duration of unemployment, with τ = 1, 2, ..., T . The value τ = T
stands for unemployment durations greater than or equal to T . That is, workers with
τ = T form the homogeneous group of the long-term unemployed. Unemployment duration
is public information.8 In contrast, there is symmetric incomplete information on the type
of the worker. That is, the worker’s type is unobservable to both the worker herself and
potential employers. Concretely, we make two assumptions on what information is held and
acquired in each period to ensure that current unemployment duration is the only observable
6Although the analysis is done with two types of workers for expositional simplicity, the model can easily
be extended to any finite number of types.
7Our suitability concept is in line with the frictions proposed by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001, p.402).
We further comment on this in Section 4. It could also be interpreted as an extreme form of match-specific
productivity if output is the product of a match-specific component and worker’s time-invariant productivity.
We would say that a worker is unsuitable for a given firm if the match-specific term were zero. Suitability
may also represent a reduced-form of modeling the scope of tasks at a given job, where skilled workers can
do a larger number of tasks. The central assumption in our setting is that skilled workers perform better at
the testing stage.
8Kroft, Lange, and Notowidigdo (2013) report that 75% of the actual resumes they collected from job
boards did specify the year and month the last job of the candidate had ended.
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characteristic.
First, we assume that information about a worker’s type reduces to her current unem-
ployment spell. Specifically, the worker herself only knows the information of the current
spell. This assumption is made for tractability since the whole labor history of each worker
would be informative to herself and recruiting firms otherwise. In support of this, Eriksson
and Rooth (2014) find that past, unlike contemporary, unemployment does not drive the
recruiting decisions of firms. Second, for tractability and since our main interest is the hir-
ing behavior of firms, we abstract from the worker’s learning, which has been modeled in
Gonzalez and Shi (2010), and assume that job-seekers do not learn from their own search
experience. Thus, a worker’s search influences only their contemporaneous prospects in the
labor market, but do not affect their continuation value of unemployment if failing to find a
job.9
Consequently, workers with unemployment duration τ are all observationally identical,





where ui(τ) denotes the measure of unemployed workers of type i and duration τ at the
beginning of a given period. The unemployment distribution u ≡ {ui(τ)}i,τ is the aggregate
state variable in this economy. The expected match productivity of a suitable candidate of





Each period consists of four stages: the separation stage, the job-posting stage, the
application and meeting stage, and the hiring and production stage. At the beginning of
the period, in the first stage, idiosyncratic job-separation shocks hit ongoing matches with
probability δ. In those cases, the worker becomes newly unemployed and the firm exits.
The Job-posting Stage. In the second stage, firms decide whether to enter the labor
market or not. As is common in the search literature, each firm posts a single vacancy.
Firms incur a cost k when posting the vacancy. To ensure existence of equilibria, we assume
that vacancy creation costs are low relative to the discounted net productivity of unskilled
workers, i.e. k < y`−b
1−β(1−δ) .
9We discuss the sensitivity of the main results to the information structure in Section 5.
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Recruiting firms announce and fully commit to a contract. A contractual offer consists of
a menu of wages, which may be contingent on expected productivity.10 Let ω ≡ {wτ}τ≤T ∈
[0, yh]
T denote a job offer. We shall refer to a submarket as the marketplace defined by
a given contract. Two remarks are in order. First, we could allow for wage contracts to
specify a continuous function of expected productivity. Since in our model only a finite
number of expected productivity levels prevail, we can restrict the set of contracts to finite
wage schemes without loss of generality. Second, we index wages by unemployment duration
instead of expected productivity. This notation does not mean that wages are contingent
on duration, as it may be against the law. This is for notational simplicity as expected
productivity given by expression (2) maps bijectively to unemployment duration.
The Application and Meeting Stage. Unemployed workers observe all job offers and
submit one application. Search is directed in the sense that those vacancies that promise a
higher expected value will attract a larger number of applicants. However, firms set a menu of
wages not only to trade off higher wages with a higher rate of applications (extensive margin),
but also to influence the relative number of candidates of a given expected productivity
(intensive margin).
Meetings are multilateral in the sense that any given firm may receive several appli-
cations. As is standard to assume in the literature for large economies, (observationally)
identical workers use identical mixed application strategies, and, hence, the realized number
of applications a firm receives for any given unemployment duration is a Poisson random
variable under the assumption that actual applications are independent across workers. The
key characteristic of a multilateral meeting technology is that it enables firms to compare
applicants.
The Hiring and Production Stage. In the hiring stage, firms make three decisions if
receiving any application. First, they rank candidates according to their expected profitabil-
ity. Second, they test those who are ranked first. Third, they select a suitable applicant,
if there is any. In this last step, firms are assumed to randomize among suitable workers
who are observationally identical (i.e. with the same unemployment duration), leading to
the so-called coordination frictions. If no candidate is suitable, then they continue testing in
the chosen order. The firm vanishes if there is no suitable candidate queueing for the job.
Firms have access to a simple testing technology: A firm observes a private, match-specific
10In particular, wages cannot be contingent on ex-ante unobservables such as the ex-post revealed actual
productivity or the outcome of the meeting process (that is, e.g., how many applications the firm received
of each type). We think of those events as unverifiable by a third party and therefore non-enforceable.
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signal, which perfectly identifies unsuitable matches. Unsuitable candidates are discarded as
the match turns out to be unproductive. Other than determining suitability, firms have no
means to identify the type of the applicants when making the hiring decision. We assume
that the test outcome is not verifiable and cannot be traded. Thus, neither workers nor
other firms learn the private signals of any given firm. Furthermore, the testing expenses
are included in the vacancy creation cost k.
Firms decide on an order to start testing applicants.11 Formally, a firm sets a ranking
rule σ. This ordering must be such that, for any τ, τ ′ ∈ {1, ..., T},
σ(τ) < σ(τ ′) iff either Jτ (ω) > Jτ ′(ω) or Jτ (ω) = Jτ ′(ω) and τ < τ ′, (3)
where Jτ (ω) stands for the type-ω firm’s expected discounted value when filling the vacancy
with a suitable worker of duration τ . We have imposed that if two different durations
correspond to the same expected profitability, then workers with the shorter spell are ranked
higher by assumption. For a given value of the state variable u, the permutation σ is bijective
by construction.
We are interested in the equilibrium allocation in which firms rank candidates by un-
employment duration. Therefore, for expositional simplicity, we guess that the ranking rule
σ(τ) = τ is consistent with the profit-maximizing behavior of firms, and, later on, Propo-
sition 2.3 will verify this guess.12 The intuition is that expected productivity declines with
unemployment duration irrespective of the ranking rule firms have chosen in the past as the
more productive workers are more likely to leave unemployment at any duration. Thus, our
guess on the optimal ranking rule must be read as follows: firms rank candidates by expected
productivity because the more productive applicants are also the more profitable ones. All
agents rationally anticipate that recruiting firms will optimally rank workers by expected
productivity (or, equivalently, duration) at any point in time. Finally, production takes
place.The worker and all other agents in the economy only observe the hiring decision. 13
11Since testing costs are included in the vacancy creation costs k, firms could test all applicants at once
instead of proceeding according to some order, and then rank suitable candidates by profitability. The
economy that results from this alternative interpretation is completely equivalent to ours, except for the
fact that the rate at which an applicant is called back for an interview would be 1 for all applicants by
construction. However, our setting can be defended on the grounds that a tiny testing cost would make
firms establish some order in the testing process.
12In contrast to Lang, Manove, and Dickens (2005), Shimer (2005a), Peters (2010) and our setting, Shi
(2002) allows firms to commit to a menu of wages and also to a ranking rule ex-ante. In this alternative
contracting space, he shows that it is also ex-ante optimal to rank workers by productivity.
13Consistent with our information assumptions, we can assume that either the actual worker’s productivity
is never learned by employers, or it is instantaneously learned upon hiring but firing is not allowed because
of full commitment.
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Matching Probabilities. A firm posting a job ω expects qτ (ω) suitable applicants of
duration τ . To simplify notation, we will omit the dependence of the expected queue length
q on the contract ω hereafter, unless needed for clarity. Define qτ ≡ (q1, q2, ..., qτ ). For each
firm, the probability of filling a job ω with a suitable worker of duration τ is
ητ (q




1− e−qτ ) . (4)
The first factor of this expression stands for the Poisson probability that no worker with a
higher ranking than a candidate of duration τ either applies to the firm or, if applies, is found
suitable for the job.14 The second term is the Poisson probability that the firm receives at
least one suitable application from workers of duration τ . Note that this expression captures
both the firm’s ranking strategy and the fact that unsuitable workers are never hired.
Since the measures of newly employed workers and filled vacancies of each duration must
coincide, it must be the case that ντ (q
τ )qτ = ητ (q
τ ), where ντ (q
τ ) denotes the job-finding
probability for a worker of duration τ conditional on applying to a type-ω firm and being
suitable for the job. That is,
ντ (q
τ ) = e−
∑




Therefore, the actual matching probability for a worker of duration τ is then defined as
hτ (q
τ ) = pτντ (q
τ ) = e−
∑




14The application and meeting process can be also thought of as the limit to the large economy of its
counterpart in a finite game with the urn-ball meeting protocol. In this sense, we can derive the first factor
of expression (4) as the limit of the probability of receiving no suitable application of a shorter duration in
the finite economy. That is, we take the limit of the probability of receiving at least one suitable application
as {ui(τ)}i and v (the mass of vacancies) go to infinity, while keeping the ratio
∑
i λiui(τ)
v constant. Let ρτ (ω)
be the probability with which a worker of duration τ applies to a job offering contract ω. A firm receives no


















Finally, the second factor of expression (4) is obtained by taking the limit of expression (5).
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The exit rate from unemployment has three components. The first factor incorporates the
firm’s ranking strategy. We refer to it as the callback rate as it is the probability of being
called for an interview, which occurs if no suitable worker with a shorter spell queued up
for the same job. The second term captures how the composition of the unemployment pool
evolves with unemployment duration, i.e. the sorting mechanism. The third term results
from the standard coordination frictions among applicants of duration τ .
Value Functions. Let us proceed with the value functions of workers and firms. An em-
ployed worker derives utility from wages until the arrival of an idiosyncratic job-termination
shock, which occurs with probability δ. Her value function is defined by
Eτ (ω) = wτ + β
(
δU1 + (1− δ)Eτ (ω)
)
(8)
An unemployed worker of duration τ has value Uτ . She may apply to any posted job offer
ω, and becomes employed with probability hτ (q
τ (ω)), in which case she receives the value
Eτ (ω). Otherwise, she produces b at home and remains unemployed one more period. A
worker of duration τ applies to a job offering contract ω if the expected value derived from ω
equates the unemployment value Uτ for a positive qτ (ω). Otherwise, no worker of duration
τ applies to such a job, and qτ (ω) = 0. Expectations about qτ (ω) are thus pinned down on
and off the equilibrium. The following equilibrium condition summarizes this logic.
Uτ ≥ hτ (qτ (ω)) (Eτ (ω)− b− βUτ+1) + b+ βUτ+1 (9)
and qτ (ω) ≥ 0, with complementary slackness,
where UT+1 ≡ UT .
Now, the expected value of a firm offering contract ω and filling its vacancy with a worker
of duration τ amounts to the worker’s expected productivity net of wages until the arrival
of a job-destruction shock, when it exits the economy. Its value function is defined by
Jτ (ω) = yτ − wτ + β(1− δ)Jτ (ω). (10)
Firms write contracts to maximize profits. A firm incurs a recruitment cost k when
posting a vacancy. A job with contract ω is filled with a candidate of duration τ with
probability ητ (q
τ (ω)), and then the firm obtains the expected value Jτ (ω). The value function
11












Next, we define the symmetric directed search equilibrium in the steady state. We use the
term symmetric to refer to the case where identical agents make identical decisions. In
particular, all firms commit to the same contract.
Definition 1 A steady state symmetric directed search equilibrium consists of a distribution
of unemployed workers u ∈ [0, 1]2×T , value functions Jτ , Eτ : [0, yh]T → R+, and V, Uτ ∈
R+, ∀τ ∈ {1, ..., T}, a menu of contracts ω ∈ [0, yh]T , an expected queue length function
Q ≡ (Qτ )τ : [0, yh]T → R+T , and the ranking rule σ(τ) ≡ τ such that:
i) Given Q and u, the value functions satisfy the Bellman equations (8)-(11).
ii) Firms’ profit maximization and zero-profit condition:
- Given u and ω, the ranking rule σ satisfies condition (3).
- Given (Uτ )τ , Q, and u, ω is the profit-maximizing contract, and expected profits
become zero at ω:




′))Jτ (ω′) ≤ V = 0, with equality for ω′ = ω.
iii) Workers direct their search:
∀ω′ ∈ [0, yh]T and ∀τ ∈ {1, ..., T}, Qτ (ω′) satisfies the complementary slackness condi-
tion (9).
iv) Recursivity condition:
Let qτ ≡ Qτ (ω). The distribution of workers recursively satisfies




, ∀τ ∈ {2, ..., T − 1},

























, if qτ 6= 0. (13)
Firms maximize profits, which equal zero in equilibrium because of free entry. To rank
applicants by unemployment duration is profit maximizing. The third equilibrium condition
is required to pin down rational expectations on queue lengths out of the equilibrium. This
condition determines the expected queue length for any given contract attractive to workers
by making them indifferent between the equilibrium contract and this other offer.
The aggregate state variable u is determined by the history of all agents’ equilibrium
decisions. The Law of Large Numbers ensures that a measure ui(τ)λiντ (q
τ ) of type i workers
with duration τ becomes employed. Thus, the fourth condition determines the law of motion
for the state variable. Finally, the set of constraints (13) result from the requirement that in
a symmetric equilibrium the ratio of suitable workers to the queue length must be the same
across durations.
We now rewrite expression (11) as the profit maximization problem of a representative





τ )Jτ (ω)− k (14)
s. to pτητ (q
τ )
(






= qτUτ , ∀τ
That is, firms choose the pair (ω, qT ) that maximizes their profits, rationally anticipating the
relationship between wages and queue lengths that arises from the optimal search behavior of
workers. Indeed, the constraints are the equilibrium complementary slackness conditions ( 9).
For later use, it is convenient to define ∆τ ≡ Jτ (ω)+Eτ (ω)−b−βUτ+1 = yτ+βδU11−β(1−δ)−b−βUτ+1.
It is the net value of a match with a worker of duration τ . The following proposition states
that there exists a solution for the firm’s problem. We also provide a sufficient condition
for uniqueness. Moreover, we show that it is optimal for firms to attract applicants of all
durations in equilibrium.
Proposition 2.1 Given the state variable u and the unemployment values Uτ for τ ∈
{1, ..., T}, there exists a solution (ω, qT ) for the firm’s program. If ∆τ falls with duration,
then the firm’s problem has a unique solution. Furthermore, in any symmetric equilibrium,
all queue lengths are strictly positive, qτ > 0 ∀τ .
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The next proposition establishes existence of symmetric equilibrium by showing that it
can be formulated as a fixed point problem, and then applying the Brouwer fixed-point
theorem.
Proposition 2.2 There exists a symmetric directed search equilibrium.
This result together with Proposition 2.1 implies that workers of all unemployment du-
rations search in the same labor market. Firms find it profitable to attract all workers in
order to both increase the probability of filling their vacancies and extract a higher share
of the surplus from a given match.15 The latter relies on the firms’ ability of treating dif-
ferent applicants differently through wages and ranking. To see this, notice that, because
of the ranking by expected productivity, the presence of workers with longer unemployment
durations queueing for the job hedges the firm’s risks of ending up with the vacancy not
filled by any worker of duration τ . As a result, the standard trade-off between wages and
job-filling rates is weakened for applicants with shorter durations, so that firms lower the
wage promises to these workers.
A natural question is why there is no profitable deviation targeting only a subset of
workers. This is a fair critique to random search models with ranking wherein all job-seekers
are concentrated in a single market by assumption, like Blanchard and Diamond (1994).16
The intuition underlying this critique is that if workers could direct their search, the ranking
strategy would no longer take place in equilibrium. This is because firms could profitably
deviate by targeting only workers with a given duration τ and saving on wages by offering
them a higher job-finding rate. In contrast, this logic does not hold in our setting because the
deviating firms would find it more profitable to attract not only all workers with durations
longer than τ for the two reasons listed above, but also workers with shorter durations as
they are more profitable.17 Therefore, deviations with such a recruiting strategy cannot be
profitable.
2.3 Equilibrium Duration Dynamics
In this section, we look at the duration dynamics of the equilibrium variables. A key result is
stated in the following proposition: although the distribution of expected productivities is an
endogenous outcome, expected productivity falls with unemployment duration regardless of
15Recall that all workers are employable as their market productivity is strictly higher than their home
productivity by assumption.
16See e.g. Shi (2002)
17To see this formally, notice that deviating firms must also solve problem (14) because its formulation
allows for workers of a given duration τ not being targeted (i.e. qτ = 0).
14
how firms ranked candidates in the past. The underlying intuition is that skilled candidates
are more likely to be suitable for any job than their unskilled counterparts at any duration
and, hence, the relative mass of skilled job-seekers declines as the duration of unemployment
increases. Therefore, ordering candidates by expected productivity is equivalent to ordering
them by unemployment duration. It turns out that the most productive candidates are the
most profitable ones in equilibrium as the fall in the expected productivity is not offset by
the wage changes over duration. We give more intuition for why wages decline by less than
expected productivity when we discuss equilibrium wages further below in this section. As a
result, it is optimal for firms to rank candidates by their unemployment duration, confirming
that the imposed ranking rule is consistent with profit-maximizing behavior.
Proposition 2.3 Independently of the ranking rule, yτ falls with unemployment duration τ .
Furthermore, the value of an active firm Jτ (ω) declines with τ in equilibrium.
The continuous decline in expected productivity suggests that the employment prospects
of a worker also deteriorate over time. Proposition 2.4 shows that the equilibrium unem-
ployment value, Uτ , declines with duration. More importantly for us, callback rates for an
interview and exit rates from unemployment also fall with duration. Both rates fall because of
firms’ ranking decision, but also because of the labor market being non-segmented in equilib-
rium. To see this, consider a labor market segmented by different subsets of unemployment
duration. If firms ranked workers by duration given this market structure, callback rates
would exhibit upward jumps as workers of duration τ would be ranked last in one submarket
whereas workers of duration τ + 1 would be ranked first in another submarket. Moreover,
since the probability of being suitable would monotonically decline with duration, the slope
of the duration profile of exit rates would be ambiguous at those points.
It is worth underscoring that sorting is the primary factor underlying the negative re-
lationship between unemployment duration and both callback and exit rates. To be more
precise, the ranking by expected productivity relies on the information flows generated by
the sorting mechanism. If there were no sorting, i.e. if λ` = λh, the probability pτ would
be constant and unemployment duration would not be informative about the applicants’ ex-
pected productivity, thereby eliminating the rational grounds of ranking. 18 The equilibrium
allocation would not differ from the standard setting with homogeneous workers, in which
all agents meet in the same market and exit rates and re-employment wages are constant
in unemployment duration. However, arbitrarily small differences in suitability rates across
18If λ` = λh and firms ranked by unemployment duration, firms targeting workers who are discriminated
against would make strictly positive profits.
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types would make the component pτ roughly constant over unemployment duration, while
they would translate into large falls in callback and exit rates because of the amplification
through ranking. Likewise, if there were no productivity differences across workers (y` = yh)
and, hence, firms did not rank applicants, exit rates would still decline because of sorting. 19
Proposition 2.4 The callback rate, the job-finding rate and the value of unemployment for
a worker fall with unemployment duration.
We now turn to the determination of equilibrium wages. Wages obtain directly by manip-
ulating the first order conditions of the firms’ problem (14) and the complementary slackness
conditions (9). They are determined by the following expression.
wτ + βδU1










τ ′′=τ+1 qτ ′′ (1− e−qτ ′ )∆τ ′
)
+ b+ βUτ+1, (15)
where UT+1 ≡ UT . The left hand side of this expression is the employment value Eτ (ω). In
search models, workers are paid a share of the match surplus on top of their unemployment
value. In directed search models, the worker’s share is determined in equilibrium as the
elasticity of the job-filling probability, which is the fraction in the first term on the right hand
side of equation (15). In our setting with multilateral meetings, it can also be interpreted
as the probability that the applicant is the only one of duration τ conditional on the firm
receiving at least one suitable application of that duration. This term is multiplied by the
net value of the match minus the expected net value derived from any other potential match
with workers of higher durations.20 In other words, workers are rewarded according to their
marginal value relative to the next best alternative. Now, for workers of low durations the
value of this next best alternative is larger than for workers of high durations, which leads
to a wage profile that is less steep than the productivity profile. This explains the result in
Proposition 2.3 that ex-post profits decline in duration.
Do equilibrium wages decline with unemployment duration? They need not. The
following proposition claims that wages do not always fall with duration if worker types are
sufficiently similar in at least one dimension.
19It is very easy to show that pτ continuously falls with duration.
20Notice that if there were another applicant of duration τ , the marginal value of the worker would be zero.
Since contractual offers cannot be made contingent on the number of applications received, firms commit
to the expected marginal value of the applicant by averaging over these two events. As Shimer (2005a) and
others have pointed out, equilibrium wages would equal the expected compensation a worker would obtain
if the firm sold the job to the worker by using a second price sealed bid auction.
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Proposition 2.5 There exists ² > 0 such that wT > wT−1 if either yh−y` < ² or λh−λ` < ².
To better understand the wage dynamics, consider the T = 2 economy, in which job-
seekers can be either short-term (τ = 1) or long-term (τ = T = 2) unemployed. We rewrite
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It follows that























Consider first the limit case: either y` = yh or λ` = λh. Then, the left hand side of
the inequality is zero because y1 = y2. However, the right hand side is strictly positive
because the first term within the parenthesis is greater than one whereas the second is lower
than one. Thus, w1 < w2. Consider now an arbitrarily small gap in either productivity or
suitability rates between types so that the difference in expected productivity between short-
and long-term workers y1− y2 is also arbitrarily close to zero. Then, the above inequality is
violated, and wages are higher for the long-term unemployed.
The intuition is as follows. If worker types were sufficiently close in either dimension
and were perfectly observable, then their unemployment values should also be close. Since
in our setting types are not observable, but unemployment duration is, then the value of
unemployment could not fall significantly with unemployment duration in that case. As
firms discriminate against long-term unemployed workers in the hiring stage in equilibrium,
w2 would have to be larger than w1 to compensate for the lower matching probability.
Notice that this result of increasing wages holds even if types are very dissimilar in the other
dimension because this large difference is not translated into productivity differences over
unemployment duration. That is, if skilled workers were much less likely to be screened out,
but almost equally productive as the unskilled, expected productivity would decline very
little as the productivity of the unskilled would be a lower bound. Instead, if suitability
rates were arbitrarily close and skilled workers were much more productive, the impact of
sorting would be very weak and the expected productivity decline would also be tiny.
It is apparent from the previous reasoning that expected productivity must fall sufficiently
with unemployment duration to make wages decline. This decline in expected productiv-
ity requires sufficiently large differences in both productivity and suitability rates between
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worker types. However, this may not suffice for the T > 2 case as applicants of longer
durations may also queue for the same job and, hence, some degree of convexity in the en-
dogenous distribution of expected productivities seems necessary for falling wages. This is
because firm’s ranking decision implies that workers are worth a share of their marginal value
instead of their productivity, and marginal values may not be monotonically decreasing even
if expected productivities are. Our numerical work for high T values indicates that wages
monotonically decline for a broad range of parameter values, although not in all instances. 21
To conclude, unlike in models with bilateral meetings, where workers get a share of their
productivity net of their own outside option, wages in our model reward the workers’ pro-
ductivity net of workers outside option and the firm’s next best alternative. As a result, the
ranking mechanism in our framework with multilateral meetings compresses wage differences
across workers of different durations.
2.4 Constrained Efficiency
The equilibrium in the static models with observable worker productivities of Shi (2002)
and Shimer (2005a) is constrained efficient. For tractability reasons, we study the efficiency
properties of our model within a simplified two-period version, the details of which we dele-
gate to Appendix 6.3. In contrast to their static models, we find that constrained efficiency
is not attained in our setting because of a twofold intertemporal inefficiency. 22
The intuition for this result is as follows. Due to sorting, vacancy creation in period one
affects job creation in the second period through two margins: a vacancy posted in period
one both lowers the expected number of suitable candidates queueing for jobs, and reduces
the expected productivity of the matches in period two. The second externality has been
previously identified by Albrecht, Navarro, and Vroman (2010) and Che´ron, Hairault, and
Langot (2011).23
To understand this inefficiency result, it is instructive to study the limit cases. First,
if the testing technology is almost not informative (λh ∼ λ`) and, hence, neither sorting
21While the effect of the next best worker on wages can be significant, the reduction in value due to the
long-term unemployed applicants, which have a low matching probability, tends to be quite small. Blanchard
and Diamond (1994) find a similar result.
22Contrary to the informational cascade literature, firms do use their private signals and complement them
with the publicly available information in our model. Thus, the inefficiency result found in this literature,
which is due to the herding behavior of the agents who decide not to use their own information, is not present
in our setting. See e.g. Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992).
23These two models are built within a random search framework with wage-bargaining. They find that
the so-called Hosios condition does not suffice to attain constrained efficiency as wages are negotiated after
learning the characteristics of the worker at hand, while firms’ entry decision hinges on the workers’ average
productivity.
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nor ranking take place, our setting turns out to be equivalent to the complete information
economy. Put differently, symmetric incomplete information by itself does not generate
inefficiencies. The limit case with λh = 1 and λ` arbitrarily small is of particular interest as
the equilibrium is constrained inefficient even though the second externality is not present
because all unskilled workers are unsuitable and automatically discarded. Why is this the
case? If candidates’ types are (arbitrarily close to be) perfectly learned through testing, but
workers remain uninformed, recruiting firms benefit from the information asymmetry: the
unemployment value is lower than optimal, firms post inefficiently low wages, and firms’
entry becomes inefficiently large because they do not internalize the effects on period-two
firms. In contrast, the social planner only cares about the mass of suitable workers, and
pays no attention to the information asymmetry. For values of λ` between 0 and λh, the
two intertemporal externalities are not fully internalized in equilibrium. We show that
constrained efficiency can be attained in the market economy by properly taxing the entry
of firms.
3 No-ranking Economy
In the benchmark economy, firms have two instruments to discriminate among observation-
ally different candidates. They can offer different wages to different candidates, but also
rank them according to expected profitability in the hiring stage. To understand the im-
portance of ranking, we study an alternative setting, to which we refer as the NR economy,
wherein firms can only use wages as a discrimination instrument, and are forced to test all
candidates and randomize among suitable applicants in the hiring stage. Callback rates are,
thus, constant over unemployment duration by construction. Moreover, recruiting firms that
attract applicants of different expected productivities must form rational expectations about
the proportions of each type. Other than that, the economy is identical to the benchmark.
The probability of becoming employed conditional on being suitable for the job ω does




, where q(ω) denotes the expected number of applicants to job ω.24 The
exit rate from unemployment still depends on the length of the unemployment spell because
24Although this conditional probability formula may be intuitive given firms’ randomization among suitable
applicants, it can be formally derived as follows (we are thankful to Steffen Grønneberg for giving key
insights). Let qT ≡ (q1, ..., qT ) and q ≡
∑
τ qτ . Since the probability distribution that governs the arrival of
applications of any type is Poisson, a firm hires a type τ worker with probability













of the sorting factor, hτ (q(ω)) = pτν(q(ω)). Consistently, the probability of filling a job
equals η(q(ω)) = 1− e−q(ω).25
When posting job ω, firms form rational expectations about the probability of filling the
vacancy with a worker of duration τ . Let ρ(ω) ≡ (ρ1(ω), ..., ρT (ω)) be a point of the unit










Likewise, the unemployment value for a worker with unemployment duration τ applying
to job ω is
hτ (q(ω)) (Eτ (ω)− b− βUτ+1) + b+ βUτ+1 ≤ Uτ , and ρτ (ω) ≥ 0, (19)
with complementary slackness, and q(ω) > 0 iff max
τ
ρτ (ω) > 0
Notice that these two expressions are the counterparts of expressions (11) and (9) in the
NR economy, respectively, and only differ in the object ρ. The expectations on the queue
length q and proportions ρ are also pinned down off the equilibrium path to help determine
the equilibrium allocation.
3.1 No-ranking Equilibrium
We next define a symmetric equilibrium in the steady state. We use the term symmetric to
refer to the allocation wherein workers who are observationally identical (i.e. workers with
the same unemployment duration) make identical decisions. However, firms may commit
to different contracts, unlike in the benchmark, and, hence, there may be a number of
submarkets open in equilibrium.
Definition 2 A steady state no-ranking symmetric directed search equilibrium consists of
a distribution of unemployed workers u ∈ [0, 1]2×T , value functions Jτ , Eτ : [0, yh]T → R+,
where ms denotes the number of applications received from type s workers, and the first term after the
sum symbol stands for the randomization strategy in the selection process. Again, the conditional job-
finding probability must satisfy ντ (qT ) = ητ (qT )/qτ . We use expression (17) to obtain a similar formula
for ντ . By manipulating conveniently the subindices, we obtain that ν ≡ ντ = ντ ′ for all τ, τ ′. Then, from
ητ (qT ) = qτν(qT ), it follows that η(qT ) ≡
∑
τ ητ (q
T ) = qν(qT ). Given that η(qT ) = 1 − e−q, we obtain





25In effect, the NR economy is equivalent to an economy with a bilateral meeting technology that matches
vacancies and suitable workers. For a related study of the relationship between the set of equilibria and the
meeting technology in an asymmetric information environment see Eeckhout and Kircher (2010).
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and V, Uτ ∈ R+, ∀τ ∈ {1, ..., T}, a distribution of vacancies F over the set [0, yh]T with
support Ω, an expected queue length function Q : [0, yh]
T → R+, and an expectation function
ρ : [0, yh]
T → {x ∈ [0, 1]T |∑t xt = 1} such that:
i) Given Q and u, the value functions satisfy the Bellman equations (8), (10), (18) and
(19).
ii) Firms’ profit maximization and zero-profit condition:
Given (Uτ )τ , Q, ρ and u, firms maximize profits at any contract in Ω, and expected
profits are zero:
∀ω∈[0, yh]T , − k + η(q(ω))
∑
τ
ρτ (ω)Jτ (ω) ≤ V = 0, with equality for ω ∈ Ω
iii) Workers direct their search:
∀ω ∈ [0, yh]T and ∀τ ∈ {1, ..., T}, Q(ω) and ρ(ω) satisfy the complementary
slackness condition (19).
∀ω ∈ Ω, Q(ω) > 0, and ∃τ ∈ {1, ..., T} such that ρτ (ω) > 0.
iv) Recursivity condition:
The distribution of workers recursively satisfies







, ∀τ ∈ {2, ..., T − 1},

























v) Market clearing: ∫
Ω
ρτ (ω)Q(ω)dF(ω) = λ`u`(τ) + λhuh(τ) (22)
When designing profit-maximizing contracts, firms form rational expectations about both
the queue length and the proportion of suitable applicants from each duration that apply
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to the job. The third equilibrium condition establishes that the expected queue length at
any job ω equals the maximum of the q values that guarantees workers of any duration τ to
obtain the unemployment value Uτ if applying to contract ω. The intuition is as follows:
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consider workers of two different unemployment durations τ and τ ′ applying to contract ω,
and let q and q′, with q < q′, denote the queue lengths that secure their unemployment value.
Then, if q were the equilibrium expected queue length, there would be a flow of workers of
duration τ ′ applying to ω, increasing the ratio of applicants per vacancy, and workers of
duration τ would no longer apply. Moreover, firms form rational expectations about the
proportion of suitable applicants from each duration that apply to the job because the labor
market may be segmented, unlike in the benchmark. The last equilibrium condition ensures
that the sum of suitable applicants of a given duration across markets must be equal to the
total supply of suitable unemployed workers of that duration.
We now turn to the firm’s problem. Given the vector (u, (Uτ )τ ), a firm chooses the
combination of an expected queue length and a wage scheme to maximize its expected
discounted profits. By choosing this pair, the firm is indeed deciding on what type of workers
to target. Since it may not be optimal for the firm to attract all workers as it will not be
able to discriminate among them ex-post, the optimal application condition (19) will only









1− β(1− δ) (23)
s. to pτη(q)
wτ + βδU1





Notice that this problem is linear in rτ . Profit-maximization requires that no firm attracts
workers of a duration τ if the expected profits are below the maximum. That is, a firm will
26This thought experiment is similar to the one in Guerrieri, Shimer, and Wright (2010) in a setting
with asymmetric information. They show that, under some sorting condition, the equilibrium is separating.
Chang (2012) shows that heterogeneity other than productivity is needed to obtain semi-pooling equilibria
with asymmetric information.
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obtain M ≡ max
τ





1− β(1− δ) (24)
s. to pτη(qτ )
wτ + βδU1
1− β(1− δ) ≥ qτUτ − qτ (1− pτν(qτ )) (b+ βUτ+1)
Thus, the firm’s problem reduces to allocating a positive weight to duration τ if the net
returns from attracting only workers of duration τ , Mτ , attain the maximum M and a zero
weight otherwise. If workers of different durations yielded the maximum return, then firms
would be indifferent between attracting applicants from one or several durations. Submarkets
are linked both through the recursivity condition of the state variable u, which helps to
determine both the expected productivity yτ and the suitability probability pτ , and the
unemployment continuation values {Uτ}τ .
Using Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, we show existence of an equilibrium allocation with
a labor market fully segmented by unemployment duration. The following proposition states
this result, and characterizes the equilibrium. Notice that any other symmetric equilibrium
must be observationally equivalent to this one. It also states that there is no equilibrium
with a single labor market because the τ = T and τ = T − 1 workers will always search in
different submarkets as ex-post profits are strictly lower if forming a match with the former
than with the latter.
Proposition 3.1 There exists an equilibrium in which the labor market is segmented by
unemployment duration and Ω = {ω1, ..., ωT}, where ωτ consists of a zero wage for all dura-
tions but τ . The equilibrium queue length qτ and wage wτ in submarket τ satisfy the following
conditions
wτ + βδU1
1− β(1− δ) =
e−qτ qτ
1− e−qτ ∆τ + b+ βUτ+1 (25)







Furthermore, there does not exist an equilibrium with a non-segmented market.
The equilibrium equation (26) is the zero-profit condition, whereas expression (25) is
the standard determination of wages and is derived from the first order condition of pro-
gram (24).27 Notice the difference between the benchmark equilibrium wages, determined
27Notice that, after replacing wages using the constraint, the objective function of problem (24) is strictly
concave in q. Therefore, the necessary first order condition is also sufficient, and there exists a unique
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in expression (15), and the wages in the NR economy. When ranking is allowed, wages are
reduced relative to the NR wages by the expected value of filling the vacancy with a suitable
candidate of a longer unemployment duration. Therefore, conditional on the same queue
lengths, equilibrium wages in the benchmark would be lower than in the NR economy.
3.2 Equilibrium Duration Dynamics
We turn now to study the dynamics of the equilibrium variables over unemployment dura-
tion. Proposition 2.3 states that expected productivity declines with duration. However,
we show below that ex-post profits Jτ need not decline with τ in the NR economy. Still,
a worker’s unemployment value falls as the length of the unemployment spell increases if
sorting takes place. Moreover, in contrast to the benchmark, reemployment wages always
fall with duration.
Proposition 3.2 The value of unemployment Uτ and reemployment wages wτ fall with un-
employment duration.
What can be said about the duration dynamics of exit rates from unemployment? If
T = 2, it can be shown that exit rates decrease with duration.28 However, in the general
case, this is more difficult to establish as the two components of the exit rates in the NR
economy, hτ (qτ ) = pτν(qτ ), can move in opposite directions. The first component is related
to the sorting mechanism and always declines with unemployment duration if λ` < λh. The
second factor also falls if qτ increases, which requires that the joint value ∆τ or, equivalently,
ex-post profits decline with duration, according to the zero-profit condition (26). However,
the profits from hiring a worker may increase with the length of her unemployment duration.
For example, consider the limit case of y` = yh. Expected productivity yτ remains constant






of the steady decline in the unemployment value Uτ . In this case, the second component of
the exit rates, ν(qτ ), increases because of a larger firm entry generated by the increase in
∆τ . Therefore, the duration pattern of the exit rates is ambiguous as the two factors move
in opposite directions as duration increases.
solution to the program.
28When T = 2, the labor market is fully segmented as the short-term unemployed workers are more
profitable than their long-term counterparts, i.e. ∆1 > ∆2. As a result, the zero-profit condition implies
that q1 < q2, and, hence, exit rates fall with unemployment duration. Proposition 3.2 states that equilibrium
wages wτ also fall. Notice that this contrasts with the increasing wages over unemployment duration in the
benchmark if worker types are sufficiently close in one dimension as stated in Proposition 2.5
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3.3 The Qualitative Effects of Ranking by Duration
In our model, sorting leads to an endogenous preference for workers with short unemployment
spells. The multilateral meeting technology together with their ability to discriminate at the
hiring stage permits firms to treat different applicants differently. Against the backdrop of
our discussion of the NR economy we now highlight the role of the firms’ ranking decision.
First, note that the ranking result is independent of whether firms have the ability to
commit to wages contingent on expected productivity or not. If firms can only commit to a
single wage contract as in Lang, Manove, and Dickens (2005) and Peters (2010), ranking by
productivity is an obvious outcome. In our setting, like in Shi (2002) and Shimer (2005a), as
contingent wages reward worker’s marginal value, they are compressed enough so that the
ex-post profits fall with expected productivity, and, hence, ranking by expected productivity
is an optimal decision.
The firm’s ability of establishing a hiring order and offering different wages is instrumental
in the labor market being non-segmented in equilibrium. By attracting all workers, firms
increase the chances to fill their vacancies. Moreover, the ranking of applicants allows firms
to further reduce the wage bill for any unemployment duration as they no longer face the
standard trade-off between a lower wage and a lower job-filling probability, since it is now
attenuated by the presence of applicants with longer unemployment spells. As a result, exit
rates fall because of sorting, which lowers the probability of passing the test as unemployment
duration increases, and the ranking decision of firms, which makes callback rates fall with
duration.
When ranking is not permitted instead, the market is segmented in equilibrium. To better
understand this, consider the T = 2 case. When firms have only wages as an instrument
to discriminate among applicants, they find it too costly to attract observationally different
workers at the same time. Suppose that a firm targeting only workers of duration τ = 1
offered the job also to workers with longer unemployment spells to increase the probability of
filling the vacancy. In equilibrium, this positive effect on expected profits would be dominated
by two negative effects. First, the firm would have to compensate the τ = 1 applicants with
higher wages because of the reduction in their job-finding probability. Second, conditional on
filling the vacancy, expected profits would be lower because expected productivity declines
over unemployment duration as stated in Proposition 2.3. In contrast, all firms find it
optimal to attract all types of workers in the benchmark economy because the two negative
effects do not occur when firms can discriminate among candidates in the hiring stage.
Notice that the result of ranking by duration is preserved even for arbitrarily small
differences across worker types. Put differently, ranking has the potential to significantly
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amplify the effects of worker differences in either productivity or suitability rates on exit
rates. We discuss the magnitudes of the ranking effect in the following section.
4 Quantitative Exploration
We next calibrate the model to the U.S. economy to gauge how well the benchmark model
captures the data, and to illustrate the quantitative effects of the ranking mechanism. To
better summarize these effects, we often focus on the values at 3 months of unemployment. 29
Furthermore, we use the calibrated model to explore how the duration dynamics of callback
rates, exit rates and wages are affected by changes in aggregate productivity.
4.1 Calibration and Results
For this numerical illustration, we use publicly available data from Current Population Sur-
vey (CPS) when possible. Our CPS data work is postponed to Appendix 6.1. We now
outline our calibration strategy.
We set a period to be a week despite transition rates in and out of unemployment being
estimated at a monthly frequency. The reason for this choice is twofold. First, unemployment
duration is reported in weeks by the subjects surveyed in the CPS, and, as Figure 5 shows,
most of the action takes place within the first 15 weeks of unemployment. Second, it alleviates
the time aggregation bias of the transition rates as we can construct the model counterparts
of actual monthly aggregates. We comment on this issue further below. The weekly discount
factor β matches a yearly interest rate of 5%. The parameter defining the state of long-term
unemployment, T , is set equal to 52 weeks.30 We normalize the market productivity of the
skilled workers to one, yh = 1.
We then jointly calibrate the parameters b, k, δ, λh, λ`, µ, and y`. We follow Hall and
Milgrom (2008) and set 71% of average worker productivity as the target for b. Parameter
k is calibrated to match the ratio of vacancy costs to the simulated average quarterly wage
per hire, which is estimated to be 13% by Abowd and Kramarz (2003).31
29The reason to choose this specific duration is twofold: it is approximately the average unemployment
duration in our sample, and marks a clear change in the slope of the duration distribution of exit rates.
Moreover, only approximately 17% of the observations in our sample correspond to unemployment durations
longer than 6 months.
30In our dataset 97% of the transitions from unemployment to employment correspond to spells shorter
than one year. Moreover, we find that our results are robust to changes in T . For example, an increase
(decrease) of T by 50% changes the fall of the exit rate at duration 3 months, relative to the first week, from
51.68% in the benchmark calibration to 52.30% (50.49%) after recalibrating.
31The number for this target that Hall and Milgrom (2008) use is 14%.
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Table 1: Calibration
Parameter Description Value Target
Exogenously Set Parameters
β Discount factor 0.999 Annual interest rate of 5%
T LTU-defining duration 52 -
yh Productivity of skilled 1.0 (Normalization)
Jointly Calibrated Parameters
δ Job-separation rate 0.0033 Predicted monthly job-separation rate
k Vacancy cost 0.7071 13% avg. quarterly wage per hire
b Home productivity 0.6968 71% of avg. productivity
λh Skilled suitability prob. 0.3195 Avg. duration prior to E within next month
λ` Unskilled suitability prob. 0.0832 St. dev., skewness
µ Share of skilled 0.3439 and kurtosis of
y` Productivity of unskilled 0.9712 monthly exit rates
The remaining parameters are related to labor market transitions. We use targets from
the predicted distributions obtained from our data set as described in Section 6.1 in the
Appendix.32 The target for the job-separation rate δ is the average monthly transition rate
from employment (E) to unemployment (U). The predicted EU transition rate has a period
average of 0.009.33
Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) find that the simple version of the urn-ball matching
technology implies too low an unemployment duration for a given ratio of vacancies to
unemployment. To improve the fit to the data they suggest to add an additional friction
in the form of match-specific suitability. This is indeed the role played by λh in our setting
(whereas λ`
λh
accounts for the relative suitability of the unskilled). Therefore, we set λh to
match an average unemployment duration of 12.57 weeks.34
The remaining parameters, λ`, µ, and y`, are related to the unobserved heterogeneity
across workers. Because differences in types translate into differences in job-finding rates,
our strategy is to make the model replicate the actual duration distribution of monthly
exit rates.35 Specifically, we target the standard deviation (0.0801), skewness (0.7725), and
32Recall expectations are quite common in the U.S. Since we do not model recall, workers expecting to
be rehired by a former employer are not counted as unemployed in the calibration targets we compute from
our predicted data. See e.g. Pries and Rogerson (2005) and Bils, Chang, and Kim (2011) for a similar
approach. In the words of Blanchard, Diamond, Hall, and Murphy (1990), recalls do not require the posting
of vacancies. Fujita and Moscarini (2012) find that 85% of workers in temporary layoff are rehired. This
significantly affects our estimates of the transition rates.
33This estimate is much lower than the standard one, reported e.g. in Shimer (2005b) for the 1951-2003
period. Yet, it is close to the numbers found by Fujita and Moscarini (2012), also for the period 1994-2012
and conditioning on permanent separations, and close to the estimate in Pries and Rogerson (2005).
34To be precise, average duration is computed as the average length of unemployment spells conditional
on finding a job within the next month both for actual and simulated data.
35As the number of worker types is fixed and sufficiently small, it can be shown that the distribution
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kurtosis (2.3267) of the distribution of the predicted monthly exit rates.
Time aggregation bias in the transition rates among employment states has been found
to be quantitatively important, particularly when estimating EU transition rates. The stan-
dard correction for this bias assumes a duration-independent exit rate, see Shimer (2005b).
Obviously, this assumption fails to hold in our setting. Instead of correcting for it in the
data, we simulate data from the model and aggregate appropriately to obtain the model
counterparts of the monthly numbers from the data. For example, for the monthly job-
separation rates, we compute, out of the total mass of workers who are employed at the
beginning of a given period, how many have become unemployed four periods later. We do
take into account that displaced workers can find new jobs in each of the interim periods,
but we do not consider further rounds in and out of unemployment as their occurrence is
negligible.
Table 1 summarizes our procedure and estimates. All the targets are very accurately
matched. One out of three workers in our economy is skilled, and they account for about
11% of the unemployed. The skilled are about four times more likely to be suitable, and
almost 3% more productive when employed.36 We can compare our model outcomes to
other available data moments not targeted in the calibration. First, the model steady state
unemployment rate is 3.79, slightly below its data counterpart of 4.18. Second, the number
of the tested unemployed per vacancy is 5.17 in the model, close to the 6.33 documented by
Barron, Bishop, and Dunkelberg (1985) for the U.S. 1980 EOPP survey, but far away from
the 12 reported by van Ours and Ridder (1992) using Dutch 1987 data.
We now turn to the duration profiles of exit rates, callback rates, and wages. 37 Figure
1(a) depicts normalized simulated data of the monthly exit rates from our calibrated model
together with the actual values. The model matches the actual duration function of the exit
rates from unemployment remarkably well. The monthly job-finding rate after 13 weeks of
by unemployment duration of exit rates along with the job-separation rate provide sufficient information
to identify the values of these parameters. In our numerical illustration, we do not aim at identifying the
unobserved distribution of types itself.
36Our interpretation of the small difference in productivities together with the large difference in suitability
rates is as follows. The suitability friction has a direct effect on the duration distribution of exit rates. In
contrast, productivity differences only affect them indirectly through its effects on vacancy creation, and such
effects are attenuated because of the ranking decision of firms. That is, regardless of how low the expected
productivity is, the exit rate of a suitable candidate with a 10-week unemployment spell is primarily reduced
by the presence of other applicants with shorter durations who are ranked higher. In contrast, in the NR
economy, productivity has a much stronger effect on vacancy creation for all durations and thus productivity
differences need to be larger to match a given duration profile of exit rates. Specifically, when the NR
economy is calibrated to the same set of targets (as reported in Appendix 6.4), productivity differences are
much larger, while the suitability rates are marginally different from the ones in the baseline calibration.
37The net value ∆τ falls with duration in equilibrium, and, hence, the firm’s problem has a unique solution.
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Figure 1: Distributions over Unemployment Duration: Model and Data.
Note: Exit rates from unemployment are the transition rates from unemployment to employment within the
following month. Wages are the expected wage conditional on being employed after four weeks. All values
are normalized by the value at the first week.
unemployment, roughly the average unemployment duration, is 51.68% of the rate at the
first week (vs. 50% in the data). As in the actual data, the simulated duration function
shows a severe decline over the first 3 months and flattens out from then on. Furthermore, we
also closely match the level of the non-normalized exit rates not targeted in the calibration.
The simulated monthly job-finding probability at the first week of unemployment is 0.43,
whereas it is 0.44 in the data.
Moreover, our calibrated model delivers a distribution of callback rates. As shown in Fig-
ure 2, these rates strongly fall across duration.38 Specifically, callback rates fall by 24% from
one month of unemployment to six months. The field experiments conducted in Oberholzer-
Gee (2008) for Switzerland, Kroft, Lange, and Notowidigdo (2013) for the U.S. and Eriksson
and Rooth (2014) for Sweden also show a steep decline of callback rates along duration. In
particular, in Kroft, Lange, and Notowidigdo (2013) fictitious job-seekers of different unem-
ployment duration each submit a single application and wait for an interview call for up to 6
weeks, although most calls arrive within the first two weeks. They find that their estimated
callback rates fall by 20% from one month of unemployment to six months.
Next, we consider reemployment wages. Recall that we do not use any target related to
wages in our calibration. Figure 1(b) displays the normalized simulated wages together with
the normalized predicted wages estimated in Section 6.1 in the Appendix. To be consistent
with the data counterpart, simulated wages for any duration τ are computed as the expected
38In this figure, weekly rates are reported.
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wage conditional on being employed after 4 weeks. While we show the wages on a magnified
scale for better visibility, the model distribution of wages over unemployment duration is
very close to the actual one. Indeed, model wages are compressed slightly more than what
we observe in the data. They fall by 0.8% after three months of unemployment (vs. 2.3% in
the data) and very slightly increase towards the end. Another way to compare the two wage
series is to compute the duration elasticity of the simulated wages by applying the regression
procedure that we used for the actual data in Section 6.1. We obtain that the data and
simulated duration elasticities are -0.0090 and -0.0032, respectively.
Why is our model able to generate the diverging pattern of exit rates and wages present
in the data? Notice that workers are heterogenous along two dimensions, which both affect
wages and exit rates. The productivity difference, yh − y`, is fairly small in our calibration
and thus expected productivity and wages do not fall much along duration. In contrast, the
large difference in the suitability parameters λh and λ` allows for a large variation of the
probability of being suitable, pτ , across durations. This makes the fall in exit rates strong.
As we argue below, the ranking component also substantially contributes to explaining the
different slopes of exit rates and wages along duration.
Decomposing the Exit Rate Dynamics. We now decompose the exit rates from our
calibrated economy into its three components determined in expression (7), i.e. the callback
rate (e−
∑
τ ′<τ qτ ′ ), the probability of passing the suitability test (pτ ), and the pure coordi-
nation friction for duration-τ workers ((1 − e−qτ )/qτ ). Figure 2 plots the job-finding rate
as well as its components, all normalized by the respective first value. As the components
cannot be individually time-aggregated we report weekly values. Both the callback rates,
which capture the ranking decision, and the probability of being suitable first rapidly decline
and then flatten out. The latter declines fast initially because of the large differences in suit-
ability rates leading to a strong sorting effect that becomes less pronounced as the pool of
unemployed more and more consists only of unskilled applicants. Further, due to sorting and
hiring, the pool of unemployed, and thus the ratio qτ , becomes smaller with duration. This
implies that a worker of low duration has relatively many competitors from the next lower
duration, whereas this is not as pronounced for workers with long spells. Thus, the callback
rate initially declines fast and then becomes flatter with duration. Finally, as qτ decreases
the coordination friction becomes less severe and therefore slightly increases with duration.
Unlike the first two components, the pure coordination friction does not contribute much to
the duration dynamics in quantitative terms.39
39In terms of levels, only the sorting factor is significantly below one at the first week and thus is the
dominating component for determining the level of the job-finding rate at the first week. Recall that the
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Figure 2: Components of Weekly Exit Rates
Notes: All values are determined on a weekly basis and normalized by the value at the first week.
4.2 The Quantitative Effects of Ranking by Duration
To provide further insights on the quantitative effects of ranking, Figure 3(a) plots the exit
rate of the benchmark model with (h) and without (hˆ) the callback rate component as well as
the exit rates of the NR economy (hNR) using the same calibrated parameters.40 Going from
the overall exit rate h to the counterfactual rate hˆ, we see that without the ranking effect
the duration profile becomes much flatter. This difference is due to the amplifying effect of
ranking on the fall of the exit rate. Next, the move from hˆ to hNR captures the additional
general equilibrium effects of ruling out ranking. While the slope of the duration profile
stays similar to the one of hˆ, there is a downward shift of the whole distribution in addition.
As a result, without ranking workers of low duration have a lower exit rate, whereas it is
the opposite for workers with high duration. In the benchmark economy, workers with short
unemployment spells face more job opportunities than in the NR economy because of a larger
entry of firms due to higher expected profits and being ranked ahead. In contrast, applicants
with longer unemployment spells are discriminated against in the benchmark, which is not
the case in the NR economy. Our calibration suggests that the difference between the two
environments regarding the decline of the exit rates is quantitatively significant. The fall
in the monthly exit rate after 3 months relative to the first week is 48% in the benchmark
-which is closely matching the fall in the data-, and only 37% in the NR economy. 41
callback rate at the first week is one by construction.
40To see the shift in levels the values are not normalized.
41While the distributions of the exit rates strongly differ across economies, the average monthly job-finding
rates and implied unemployment rates are quite similar. They are 26.4% and 3.8% for the benchmark
economy and 26.6% and 3.6% for the NR economy, respectively. Further, the vacancy rates are 0.72% for
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We can also show the effects of ranking on wages. Similar to the above comparison we
first compute counterfactual wages by omitting the summation term from expression (15).
As explained above, this summation term is due to the ability of the firm to rank applicants
and represents the expected value of the next best alternative. To capture the general
equilibrium effect we compare to the wages of the NR economy, again using the parameters
of the calibrated benchmark model. Figure 3(b) shows the wages for the benchmark (w), the
counterfactual wages without the ranking component (wˆ), and the NR wages (wNR), which
fall by 1.3% after three months of unemployment.
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Figure 3: The Effects of Ranking
Note: Exit rates and wages are determined on a weekly basis and reported as non-normalized values. Symbols
h and w refer to the equilibrium exit rates and wages in the benchmark economy, whereas hˆ and wˆ denote
the same rates and wages without the ranking factor. Symbols hNR and wNR denote the equilibrium exit
rates and wages in the NR economy.
Wages of low durations are increased more than wages for high duration when we remove
the ranking component of wages, i.e. when moving from w to wˆ. This is due to the fact that
the expected value of the next best alternative is higher for applicants of low duration. If in
addition general equilibrium effects are taken into account, wages wNR still show a steeper
decline, and are shifted downwards so that only workers with short spells get a higher wage in
the case of no ranking. Wages across duration are therefore more compressed in the presence
of ranking.
If we instead recalibrate the NR economy using the same targets, exit rates will match
closely the targeted empirical exit rates, but now wages will decline much more strongly
than in the data because the difference in the productivity values across types is now much
the benchmark and 0.75% for the NR economy, respectively.
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larger. See Appendix 6.4 for details. Thus, the ranking element helps to capture the duration
profiles of both exit rates and wages in the data.
The previous analysis has decomposed the duration dynamics of exit rates and wages into
its main driving factors, namely ranking and sorting. Recall that ranking is an endogenous
response to sorting in our model and therefore cannot be considered as an independent
factor. In particular, the relationship between ranking and sorting is very non-linear. When
there are no differences in suitability rates, unemployment duration is not informative, and
hence firms have no reason to rank candidates. However, even if there is an arbitrarily small
difference in suitability rates, firms will rank, thereby largely affecting callback rates. To
give an example, in our calibrated benchmark, the weekly rate of being suitable declines by
45% after 3 months, whereas callback rates fall by 31%. Now, if we decrease λh to a value of
just 5% above λ`, the fall in the suitability factor reduces to less than a tenth of a percent,
whereas callback rates still decline by 27%.42 Thus, even a small amount of unobserved
heterogeneity can lead to a large effect on callback rates.
4.3 Comparative Statics of Productivity Changes
We can use the calibrated model to explore the impact of changes in aggregate productivity
on the duration dynamics of callback rates, exit rates and wages. This is interesting as the
effects of productivity changes are the result of opposing forces coming from the sorting and
ranking components.
To begin with, we look at exit rates, hτ (q
τ ) = pτντ (q
τ ). On the one hand, notice that
when vacancies are relatively more abundant due to higher aggregate productivity, sorting is
stronger, workers with long unemployment spells are more likely to be unskilled and, hence,
function pτ falls more steeply over duration. On the other hand, the relative decrease of
the callback rates across durations becomes less pronounced as more vacancies are offered
because job-seekers with long spells have relatively fewer competitors of shorter duration. In
addition, at each duration, there is a lower degree of coordination friction as more vacancies
are available. As we cannot ascertain theoretically which effect dominates, we compare the
calibrated economy with one in which both productivities, yh and y`, are increased by 3%.
Figure 4 plots the ratio of exit rates and its components for the two economies. For the overall
exit rate, the ratio remains above one for all durations and is relatively higher for the longer
spells. By looking at the ratios of the individual components we can see that the effect of
callback rates is positive and increasing along duration, whereas the effect of the probability
42Wages are not affected much. The fall is reduced from 1% to approximately 0%
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of being suitable is negative and non-monotone. The effect on the coordination friction is
negligible. Overall, the sorting effect is outweighed by the ranking mechanism. That is,
an increase in aggregate productivity makes the decline in exit rates along unemployment
duration less severe due to the effect stemming from the callback rates.
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Figure 4: Effects of an Increase of both yl and yh by 3%.
Note: The plotted values represent the ratios of non-normalized exit rate and its components as well as
non-normalized wages relative to the benchmark of an economy wherein yl and yh are 3% higher than the
calibrated parameters.
We now turn to the comparative static outcome for wages. Recall that in the equilibrium
wage equation (15), the first factor stands for the conditional probability that a given worker
is the only applicant for a given duration, whereas the second term is the marginal value
of the worker. The conditional probability is higher when there are more vacancies because
the queue length q is lower. Regarding the second factor, on the one hand, the marginal
value depends on the likelihood of replacing the given candidate with another one with a
longer spell, which is lower when vacancies are less scarce. On the other hand, the sorting
component implies that the expected productivity declines more severely over duration in
this case. The total effect across durations is again difficult to determine. Figure 4 shows
that wages for increased productivities are systematically higher at all durations, whereas
there is no visible effect on the duration dynamics of wages.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
This article analyzes the effects of firm’s recruiting decisions in a labor market in which
information on worker type is symmetric and incomplete and firms test applicants. Our
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composite mechanism combines sorting and ranking, and there exists a single labor market
in equilibrium. The model rationalizes the joint declining pattern of callback rates for an
interview, exit rates from unemployment and reemployment wages.
A natural question is how sensitive the main results are to the information structure of the
model conditional on information being symmetrically held. Although these assumptions are
made for tractability, we conjecture that if either complete worker histories were observable
or the continuation value depended on the worker’s search, ranking by expected productivity
would still take place in equilibrium because of the two incentives firms have to attract many
applicants, namely to increase the job-filling probability and to reduce wages because the
marginal value of a worker is reduced by the presence of other applicants. However, if the
whole labor history were observable, expected productivity would be inferred from the whole
history of the worker instead of from the current spell and the single-market equilibrium
feature would be preserved. We conjecture that, if workers did learn from their job-search
experience, e.g. from receiving test calls or from the expected queue length associated to
their individual application, multiple labor submarkets would be active in equilibrium and
ranking by unemployment duration would prevail in each submarket.
Furthermore, by reducing the whole learning process to a test, probationary periods are
ruled out in our model. Our intuition is that firms would continue to rank applicants by
expected productivity if probation and more complex wage schemes were allowed. This is
because in any case firms would prefer to fill the vacancy with candidates of higher expected
productivity. If instead wages could not be re-adjusted when new information is acquired,
then modeling worker’s type as an experience good would make dismissals informative, which
would get us back to the previous discussion about the importance of the whole labor history
of workers. In contrast, in our setting worker’s productivity is an inspection good, thereby
limiting the information to the unemployment spell.
Finally, although this paper has focused on the steady-state equilibrium, notice that the
information conveyed by the length of joblessness spells varies over the cycle. In tight labor
markets, with a large number of vacancies per job-seeker, unemployment duration is more
informative about the expected skills of the applicants than in slack markets. Although
our comparative static analysis suggests that the ranking by duration dominates the sorting
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6 Appendix
6.1 Data
In this section, we use data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) to construct the
empirical counterparts of our model distributions. Thus the main purpose of the following
estimation procedures is to filter out observable heterogeneity and within-duration-group
dispersion that are present in the data, but cannot be accounted for in our model. We make
use of the longitudinal feature of this dataset to keep track of the employment status of the
interviewed agents as well as to record wages at re-employment.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) collects data on employment- and earnings-related
issues since 1940 by means of the CPS. Individuals stay in the survey for two sets of four
consecutive months with an eight month period in between. The fourth and eighth interviews
constitute the so-called outgoing rotation group (ORG) and earnings-related questions are
asked only then. The dataset we consider is formed by observations from the ORG for the
1994-2011 period. Surveys from June to September 1995 are excluded due to methodological
changes that prevent us from tracing individuals over time. With this rich microeconomic
dataset we can analyze the dependence of the transitions from unemployment to employment
and vice versa as well as reemployment wages on unemployment duration, which is self-
reported in weeks.
We limit our sample to individuals aged 20 to 60 years who reported being unemployed
in the previous month.43 Individuals reporting either not to be actively searching for a job
or expecting a recall in the previous month are excluded as their employment prospects
43Individuals with unemployment durations longer than one year are discarded. See the details on the
analysis of job-separation rates below.
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differ from the regular unemployed job-seekers.44 Furthermore, farming-, army- and public-
administration-related (un)employment is also removed from the pool. To keep track of
individuals over two consecutive months, we use the household identifier, person line number,
and month-in-sample, and check for consistency by comparing sex, race and age variables
across months. We use the ORG weights.
6.1.1 Job-finding Rates.
The above filters leave us with 73109 observations of exit rates from unemployment. Fig-
ure 5(a) depicts the monthly job-finding rates normalized by the value corresponding to
unemployment duration of one week. These rates are non-treated data. It shows the exit
rates smoothed by a Kernel-weighted local method, and the non-smoothed data, which are
depicted by dots. Since unemployment duration is reported in weeks, the horizontal axis is
on a weekly basis.
To remove the effects of observable characteristics, we use a Probit model to estimate the
probability of transiting from unemployment to employment with a quartic polynomial of
the unemployment duration (see the Probit details below). We assign to each individual the
predicted monthly exit rate by replacing the duration variable by her actual duration and the
remaining variables by their means. This constitutes the empirical counterpart of the model
distribution of exit rates shown in Figure 5(b) in terms of the normalized values. Regardless
of whether the data are treated or not, the unemployment-to-employment transition rate falls
rapidly with unemployment duration, with the monthly exit rate declining by approximately
50% after 3 months and flattening out from then on.
Regarding the Probit specification to estimate the empirical exit rate from unemploy-
ment, the set of regressors is formed by a yearly time variable, the log of the unemployment
rate, a quadratic polynomial of imputed experience, along with monthly, sex, race, marital
status, industry, occupation, state, education and reason of unemployment dummies. 45 In
addition, following Addison, Portugal, and Centeno (2004), we have a quartic polynomial in
unemployment duration. Table 2 shows the statistics (and standard errors in parenthesis)
of the Probit estimation.
44See e.g. Blanchard, Diamond, Hall, and Murphy (1990) for a similar approach. Furthermore, Katz
and Meyer (1990) show how the search effort depends on recall expectations and estimate the mean weekly
income loss at 14.44% upon a job switch, and at 5.73% after a recall.
45A dummy to control for the potential effects of unemployment benefits exhaustion at the 26th week is
included, although turns out not to be statistically significant. For the experience imputation, we follow the
usual procedure of subtracting 6 and the schooling years from the workers’ age. See Jaeger (1997).
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Figure 5: Normalized monthly exit rates
Table 2: Transition Probabilities from Unemp. to Emp.
Probit regression Number of obs = 73109
Wald chi2(114) = 5314.89
Prob> chi2 = 0.0000
Log pseudolikelihood = -39427.739 Pseudo R2 = 0.0897
exit Coef. (se)
unemp. duration -.1202 (.0069)
unemp. duration2 .0067 (.0000)
unemp. duration3 -.0002 (.0000)
unemp. duration4 1.43e-06 (.0000)
Notes: CPS data for 1994-2011, individuals aged 20-60 years.
6.1.2 Other Data
Job-separation Rates. In the calibration exercise, we target the average job-termination
rate. Our dataset for the analysis of job destruction is formed by individuals who reported to
be employed in the previous interview, and stay active in the labor market at the interviewing
time. We consider that a job has terminated when the worker reports to be unemployed, and
not expecting a recall. The remaining above restrictions also apply. Our dataset is formed
by 831328 observations. We run a Probit regression to estimate the empirical job-separation
rate. The same set of regressors as for the analysis of job-finding rates is used, except for
the variables related to individual’s unemployment experience. The predicted probabilities
have a mean of .009 and a standard deviation of .008.
Hourly Wages. Although we do not target wages, we compare the model duration distri-
bution of re-employment wages with its empirical counterpart. We now estimate such wages
at each unemployment duration.
In 1994 a major redesign of the CPS took place concerning both question wording and
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data processing, which particularly affected the earnings variable (see US-Census-Bureau
(2006) and Polivka (1996)). These changes make it difficult to compare hours worked and
hourly wage before and after 1994. Prior to this methodological change, individuals were
asked to report their earnings on a weekly basis, including overtime, tips, and commissions.
In addition, they were asked to report their usual working hours at all jobs. After 1994,
interviewees were allowed to report their earnings at an hourly basis, being labeled ”hourly
workers”.46 Such workers report their hourly rate at their main job, excluding overtime,
tips, and commissions. These extra payments may be also reported at the weekly basis. Re-
maining interviewees report total earnings (including extra payments), which are converted
to weekly rates.
We focus on the hourly wage of hourly workers at their main job. This may have some
caveats, particularly if there is a selection effect from excluding non-hourly workers, or if
the extra-payments are a substantial component of earnings. An alternative is to analyze
weekly earnings (extra payments included) divided by usual hours (see Schmitt (2003) for
a discussion). There are, however, some reasons in favor of our procedure: First, hourly
workers amount to 80% of the employed pool in our sample, and, for hourly workers, weekly
earnings obtain from multiplying the hourly wage and the usual number of working hours
(adding the overtime, tips and commissions, if reported). There are very few observations
with extra payment for hourly workers, however. Second, as opposed to working time at all
jobs, since 1994 usual working time at the main job has been directly addressed, and double
checked. Further, hours vary was introduced as a new answer in the working time question.
Imputation strategies may be undertaken given that such a response accounts for just 6 to
7% of the total employment (see Schmitt (2003)). However, the percentage rises to over 12%
in our subsample of newly employed. Further, Abraham and Haltiwanger (1995) emphasize
the problem of workers’ over-reporting their working time.
There are some common issues related to processing the earnings data. Regarding trim-
ming, i.e. how to best deal with implausibly high hourly wages, we follow Schmitt (2003)
and keep only hourly rates between $1 and $100. Less than 0.2% of our weekly earnings
observations are top-coded, which suggests that our filter is likely to be costless. Another
potential issue is the allocated earnings. BLS uses the cell hot decking procedure to impute
earnings to those missing responses.47 The allocated responses account for over 30% of the
outgoing rotation group after 1994, and about 25% in our subsample of newly employed
46To be precise, those individuals who prefer to report on a non-hourly basis, but declare to be paid hourly
are also labeled as ”hourly workers”.
47According to the U.S.-Census-Bureau, the weekly earnings hot deck is defined by age, race, sex, usual
hours, occupation, and educational attainment.
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workers. We have performed the analysis excluding those imputed earnings and end up with
12192 observations.48
Wages are deflated using the U.S. city average CPI-U. Analogously to the treatment to
exit rates, we plot the non-treated (smoothed and non-smoothed) average re-employment
wage at each unemployment duration normalized by the value at duration one week in Figure
6(a), and the predicted wages from a log-linear regression in Figure 6(b). The elasticity of
hourly wages with respect to unemployment duration is statistically significant and amounts
to −0.009. Analogously to the case of exit rates, in order to remove the heterogeneity
linked to observable characteristics and the within-duration-group heterogeneity, we assign
to each individual her predicted wage obtained by replacing all the variables by their means,
and duration by the reported number of weeks. After normalizing, we obtain the following
duration function w(τ) = τ−0.009.49 In sharp contrast, wages stay constant or weakly increase
with unemployment duration.














(a) Raw and smoothed data














Figure 6: Re-employment wages
Regarding the econometric approach, we estimate a Mincerian regression of log hourly
wages. The set of regressors largely coincides with the one for job-finding rates, but following
Addison, Portugal, and Centeno (2004) we include the log of unemployment duration instead
of a quartic polynomial.
The results are fairly robust relative to the data choices. For example, if allocated earnings
are included, the estimate of the log of unemployment duration is -0.0055 and statistically
significant at 10%. If non-hourly workers are also considered,50 then the elasticity amounts
48For methodological reasons, there are no imputed earnings from January 1994 to August 1995.
49An alternative approach would be to look at the modified residuals, which are the residuals added to
the duration component, i.e. ²˜i ≡ log(τi)β̂τ + ²̂i. We find that the averages of the modified residuals also
show a constant pattern in unemployment duration.
50If the interviewee responds that hours vary at the main job, we use the reported number of hours in the
last week.
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Table 3: Log Hourly Reemployment Wages
Linear regression Number of obs = 12192
F(107, 12084) = 48.067
Prob > F = 0.0000
R-squared = .3942
Root MSE = .34399
log exit wage Coef. (se)
log unemp duration -.0090 (.0036)
Notes: CPS data for 1994-2011, individuals aged 20-60 years.
to -0.01411, and the re-employment wage fall after three months of unemployment is about
3.5%. Finally, if both allocated earnings and non-hourly workers are in the sample, then
the elasticity amounts to -0.0104 and the wage fall to almost 3%. In the last two cases, the
elasticity is statistically significant at 1%.
6.1.3 Data discussion
The data work is robust to different time periods. In particular, omitting the latest recession
has no significant impact. The normalized exit rate at 13 weeks amounts to 0.5, whereas
its wage counterpart is 0.975, for the 1994-2007 period. If we looked at 1996 instead, the
corresponding normalized exit rate would be 0.442, and the wage ratio 0.959, with the
duration elasticity not statistically significant in this case.
A number of papers also use CPS data, and although the analyzed samples differ from
ours, the findings related to exit rates from unemployment are very close. Shimer (2008) ob-
tains a very similar duration function, with a 30-40% fall in the first month of unemployment
and leveling out after 3 months with a 50% fall relative to the first week of unemployment.
The comparison with the numbers in Figure 15 in Elsby, Hobijn, and Sahin (2010) is not
so direct because they group observations into longer periods. At first glance, the exit rate
for the 3-6 month unemployed workers relative to that for the 1 month unemployed seems
approximately 60-70%, yet their numbers get closer to ours once we take into account the
significant decline in the first month of unemployment. Farber and Valletta (2013) mea-
sure unemployment duration in months. According to their Figure 3, the fall in the exit
rate is smaller, but not significantly so, particularly when correcting for transitions from
unemployment to employment which are likely due to reporting errors.
Regarding reemployment wages, the empirical literature mostly aims to evaluate the ef-
fects of unemployment duration on the earnings change with respect to the pre-unemployment
spell. Methodologically, this implies that worker fixed effects are taken into account. In con-
trast, unobserved heterogeneity is present in our model mechanism and, therefore, we cannot
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clean the data of unobserved characteristics. Nonetheless, our estimates of re-employment
wages over unemployment duration do not differ much from, for example, those of Gregory
and Jukes (2001), who use UK data for the 1984-1994 period. They find that the duration
of the most recent unemployment spell reduces wages by 0.8% in the case of a spell of one
month and by 5.1% after 6 months. In our dataset, these numbers amount to approxi-
mately 1% and 3%, respectively. Flemming (2015) also estimates the effects of duration on
reemployment wages using both CPS and PSID data, and her results are very much in line
with ours. Furthermore, a number of studies investigate the effects of a variation of the
generosity of unemployment insurance and find small or no effects on re-employment earn-
ings and significant effects on unemployment duration. See e.g. Card, Chetty, and Weber
(2007) for Austria, and Van Ours and Vodopivec (2008) for Slovenia. This evidence sug-
gests that wages may be not very sensitive to unemployment duration. Addison, Portugal,
and Centeno (2004) analyze the unemployment duration effects on the two variables for the
same European dataset. They also find that the impact of duration on exit rates is strong,
mostly due to a steep decline in the arrival of job offers over duration, whereas the effects
on accepted wages are much milder.
6.2 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.1
We first show that there exists a solution to the firm’s problem (14). After some manip-
ulations and substituting out the wages from the complementary slackness conditions (9),












1−β(1−δ) − b − βUτ+1. If a sufficiently low wage wτ for some τ is offered, then
qτ = 0 and the firm derives no profits from type τ applicants.
Notice that the profit function is continuous in qT . The set of plausible vectors qT can be
restricted to a compact set since they must be non-negative and the complementary slackness
conditions (9) puts an upper bound for any duration τ . Therefore, the Weierstrass Theorem
ensures the existence of a solution.
Second, we prove by contradiction that if there exists a symmetric equilibrium, then
qτ > 0 for all τ . Suppose that there exists at least one duration group of workers such that
its associated queue is 0. Let us denote by τ0 the first duration for which the queue length
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is 0. To be consistent with the guess that profitability falls with unemployment duration,
which is confirmed in Proposition 2.3, all queues associated with longer durations must also
be 0. Then, the unemployment value of workers with unemployment duration greater than
or equal to τ0 must be b/(1−β) as they will remain unemployed forever. Let ω be the profit-
maximizing contract. Given that y` > b, there exists an arbitrarily small, but positive ² such
that b + ² < yτ0 . Consider now the alternative contract ω
′ that stipulates the same wages
as ω, but offers type τ0 workers a wage b + ². Because of the ranking strategies, workers of
duration τ0 do not crowd out the candidates with higher expected productivities, and imply
expected positive profits for the firm. Because the alternative contract ω′ delivers strictly
higher profits than ω, this cannot be profit-maximizing. Therefore, qτ > 0 for all τ .
Finally, we show that if ∆τ falls with τ , then the solution of the firm’s problem is unique,
and is characterized by the first order conditions.












τ≤s qτ (∆s −∆s+1)− e−
∑
τ≤T qτ∆T
As ∆τ declines with τ , all the coefficients of the Hessian matrix are negative, hij < 0. To
show that the Hessian is negative definite, we prove that the leading principal minors of the
Hessian alternate signs. Notice that hij does not depend on i. Thus, the Hessian has a very
particular form as hij = hi′j for all i, i
′ ≤ j and, obviously, hij = hij′ for all j, j ′ ≤ i. Let




z1 z2 z3 ... zj
z2 z2 z3 ... zj
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z3 − z4 z3 − z4 z3 − z4 ... 0
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zj zj zj ... zj
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
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The sign of the expression is positive if j is even and negative otherwise. Therefore, the
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Hessian is negative definite and the FOC are also sufficient. Furthermore, since this is the
case at any point, the objective function is strictly concave and there is a unique global
maximum. ‖
Proof of Proposition 2.2
We show existence of equilibrium. Let f : K ⊂ R3×T+ → K be defined as the composite
correspondence f ≡ φ ◦ ψ, where φ and ψ are defined below. Let K be defined as
K ≡
{







| ∀τ, ui(τ + 1) ≤ ui(τ) and uh(τ + 1)u`(τ) ≤ uh(τ)u`(τ + 1)
}
In words, K is the nonempty set of pairs formed by worker distributions in the two dimen-
sional duration-productivity space, u, and today’s expectations on tomorrow’s unemploy-
ment value (U ′τ )τ . Notice that u uniquely pins down the expected productivity yτ and the
test-passing probability pτ for all duration τ . The defining constraints ensure that the distri-
bution of workers is characterized by both a declining expected productivity and a declining
mass of each worker type over time. Obviously, the set K is compact.
We start with correspondence ψ. We define ψ(u, (U ′τ )τ ) as the set of triples (ω, q
T , (Uτ )τ )
that satisfy the system of resource constraints (13) and the zero-profit condition as well as
solve the firms’ profit maximization program (14). To determine the image we proceed in




Eτ (ω)− b− βU ′τ+1, 0
}
= qτ
Uτ − b− βU ′τ+1
pτ
(27)
This implies that either Uτ > b+ βU
′
τ+1 and qτ > 0 or Uτ = b+ βU
′
τ+1 and qτ = 0. Then, by















1−β(1−δ) − b − βU ′τ+1. We obtain the first order conditions by differentiating














and qτ ≥ 0, with complementary slackness
We now distinguish between two cases.
Case 1: qτ > 0 for all τ .
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Since qτ > 0, expression (27) implies that Uτ > b+βU
′
τ+1, which in turn leads to positive
profits linked to duration τ , ητ (q




≥ 0, (and also ∆τ > 0) as otherwise
















We now impose the system of resource constraints (13) together with the zero-profit



















as defined by (13).
We are to show that this equation has a unique solution. Let us refer to the left hand
side of this equation as F (q1). Notice that lim
q1→0
F (q1) = 0, which indicates that firm’s
expected profits (without considering the vacancy costs) are 0 if there are no applicants to




1−β(1−δ) because firms find a worker of duration τ = 1 with
probability 1, and w1 = b and Uτ =
b
1−β for all durations.
Because of our assumption y1−b
1−β(1−δ) >
y`−b
1−β(1−δ) > k and F being a continuous function of
q1, there exists a solution to equation (31). To see that the solution is unique, we now show
that the derivative of F is positive.



































F˜ (τ) ≡ e−
∑τ





The first equality is straightforward, while the second one obtains after some rearrangements.
Notice that F˜ (τ) is the left hand side of the first order condition (29). Since qτ > 0 the
inequality is indeed an equality and the right hand side is strictly positive, and, hence, so is
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F˜ (τ). This ensures that the function F is increasing. As a result, there exists a unique value
q1 that solves equation (31). Using the system of conditions (13), we obtain the solution
vector qT . The vector (Uτ )τ is now derived from the first order conditions (29). Finally,
wages ω obtain from the set of constraints of the firm’s problem.
Case 2: qτ = 0 for some τ .
The equilibrium resource constraints (13) together with Proposition 2.1 imply that queue
lengths are zero for all durations, i.e. qτ = 0. It follows from expression (27) that Uτ =
b+ βU ′τ+1 for all τ , and let wτ = b for all durations. Therefore, there is no vacancy creation
in equilibrium.
Since the triple (ω, qT , (Uτ )τ ) is uniquely determined in both cases, ψ is a function.
Furthermore, ψ is a continuous function within each case. To see that there is no discontinuity
at qτ = 0 for some τ , notice that if qτ goes to 0 so do all the other queue lengths by
construction of u˜.
Second, let φ be a function defined as φ(ω, qT , (Uτ )τ ) ≡ (u˜, (U˜τ )τ ). The first variable u˜
is uniquely determined by the equilibrium recursivity condition (12). That is, given qT , u˜ is
the unique solution of that system of equations. Furthermore, we define U˜τ = Uτ for all τ .
Notice that f(u, U ′) ∈ K as the inequalities defining K hold by construction of u˜. Finally,
the equilibrium allocation can be identified with the solution of a fixed point of correspon-
dence f . As ψ and φ both are continuous functions, so is f . Therefore, the Brouwer Fixed
Point Theorem applies to ensure the existence of a fixed point of f .‖
Proof of Proposition 2.3
We refer to the event of a worker being suitable for the job as T . Let P (i|τ, T ) denote
the probability that a worker of duration τ is of type i conditional on the event T . We show
that P (h|τ, T ) is decreasing in τ . By using Bayes’ rule,
P (h|τ, T ) > P (h|τ + 1, T )
⇔
P (h)P (τ, T |h)
P (h)P (τ, T |h) + (1− P (h))P (τ, T |`) >
P (h)P (τ + 1, T |h)
P (h)P (τ + 1, T |h) + (1− P (h))P (τ + 1, T |`)
Now, after some manipulations and taking into account that P (τ, T |i) = λiP (τ |i), this
inequality holds if and only if
P (τ |`)
P (τ |h) <
P (τ + 1|`)
P (τ + 1|h) =
P (τ |`)(1− λ` + λ`P (τ + 1|τ, T ))
P (τ |h)(1− λh + λhP (τ + 1|τ, T )) ⇔ λh > λ`
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where P (τ + 1|τ, T ) stands for the probability of staying unemployed one more period con-
ditional on being suitable.
The expected productivity can be rewritten as yτ = y`+(yh−y`)P (h|τ, T ). Since yh > y`
by assumption, the expected productivity falls with τ provided that type-` workers are less
likely to be suitable than their type-h counterparts.
The proof of declining values Jτ (ω) follows closely Shimer (2005). So, it is omitted.‖
Proof of Proposition 2.4
Let us first show that Uτ decreases in τ . For simplicity, we set b = 0. We can rewrite the
first order condition of the firm’s program (14) with respect to qτ as







τ ′′=τ+1 qτ ′′ (∆τ ′ −∆τ ′+1) + e−
∑T
τ ′′=τ+1 qτ ′′∆T
)
where once again UT+1 ≡ UT . We now proceed by backward induction. The first inequality
in the following two cases comes from pτ > pτ+1 for all τ .
Case T − 1:
UT−1 − UT > pT e−
∑T−1




1− β(1− δ) ,
and the final expression is strictly positive.
Case τ :
Uτ − Uτ+1 > β(Uτ+1 − Uτ+2) + pτ+1e−
∑τ
1 qτ ′ (∆τ −∆τ+1) =
= β(Uτ+1 − Uτ+2)(1− pτ+1e−
∑τ
1 qτ ′ ) + pτ+1e
−∑τ1 qτ ′ y¯τ−y¯τ+1
1−β(1−δ) ,
which is also strictly positive by induction and the outcome of falling expected productivities.
To prove that the exit rate declines with unemployment duration, we first show that the








Notice that the left hand side always lies above 1, whereas the unity is an upper bound
for the right side. The inequality becomes equality if and only if we are in the limit case
qτ = qτ+1 = 0.
Now, to show that the exit rate also declines with τ , we just need to remember that
hτ (u, q
τ ) = pτ (u)ντ (q
τ ) and that the two factors have been proved to decline with τ .‖
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Proof of Proposition 2.5.
Consider first the case of small differences in the suitability rate, λh = λ` + ², with ² > 0
arbitrarily small. After some simple simplifications, we can write the difference in expected
productivities as







yhλhuh(T − 1) + y`λ`u`(T − 1)
)
×
λhuh(T − 1) + λ`u`(T − 1)






Notice that the right hand side vanishes as ² goes to 0. Therefore, the left hand side of the
last inequality of the counterpart of expression (16) for durations T − 1 and T is arbitrarily
close to 0, whereas the right hand side is strictly positive, which implies wT−1 < wT .
The case with arbitrarily small differences in productivity is obvious because the expected
productivity yτ is a convex combination of y` and yh, and, hence, yT−1 − yT < yh − y`.‖
Proof of Proposition 3.1
Consider the case in which all recruiting firms target a single duration by posting contract
ωτ , which has all its components equal to 0 except the wage wτ . Let a submarket be
defined by the pair (qτ , ωτ ) that is the maximizer of the firm problem (24). Given u and
(Uτ )τ , such a solution is pinned down by equations (25) and (26), which correspond to the
first order condition and the zero-profit condition, respectively. We define Q(ωτ ) = qτ and
ρτ (ω
′
τ ) = Iτ (τ ′), where Iτ (τ ′) is an indicator function that values 1 if τ = τ ′ and 0 otherwise.
Furthermore, for any other ω ∈ [0, yh]T , Q(ω) is pinned down by the maximum queue length
that makes workers of all durations indifferent to the equilibrium contract to which they
apply to. It is easy to show that it satisfies all the remaining equilibrium conditions.
Now, before showing the existence of the fully segmented equilibrium, we prove that there
cannot be an equilibrium with a single labor market. If there were a pooling equilibrium,
then all workers would face the same expected queue length. Proposition 2.3 states that
expected productivity falls with unemployment duration. Therefore, ∆T−1 > ∆T , and the
zero-profit condition (26) implies that qT−1 < qT . That is, workers with unemployment
duration T − 1 and T must search in different submarkets in equilibrium.
We next show the existence of a fully segmented equilibrium, which resembles the proof




T is a compact set. We
define f as the composite correspondence f ≡ φ ◦ ψ, where φ and ψ are defined as follows.
First, let z ≡ (u, (U ′τ )τ ) and ψ(z) be defined as the set of elements {qτ , wτ , Uτ}τ that satisfy
52
the zero-profit conditions (26), solve the firms’ profit maximization program (24) and Uτ
is obtained as a new iteration using equation (19). Second, let φ be a function defined as
φ(ω, qT , (Uτ )τ ) ≡ (u˜, (U˜τ )τ ), where u˜ is uniquely determined by the equilibrium recursivity
condition (20), and U˜τ = Uτ for all τ . Notice that the equilibrium allocation can be identified
with the solution of a fixed point of correspondence f . We are to show that f is a continuous
function, and, then, Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem applies to ensure the existence of a
fixed point of f .
To show that f is a continuous function, it suffices to show that ψ(z) is singleton and
continuous for every z ∈ K as its other component is obviously a continuous function. Notice
that the objective function of program (24), after replacing wages, is strictly concave in q.
Therefore ψ is a function. The Maximum Theorem ensures that ψ is continuous in z ∈ K.
Therefore, the composite function is also a continuous function.‖
Proof of Proposition 3.2.
We first show that the unemployment value falls with duration. The proof is by backwards
induction. Recall that the value of unemployment can be written as
Uτ = hτ (qτ )γ(qτ )∆τ + b+ βUt+1 = pτe
−qτ∆τ + b+ βUt+1
First, we show that UT < UT−1.
UT < UT−1 ⇔ pT e−qT∆T < pT−1e−qT−1γ(qT−1)∆T−1
Notice that ∆T ≤ ∆T−1 and pT < pT−1 if λ` < λh. Then, the zero-profit condition (26)
implies qT−1 ≤ qT . Therefore, UT < UT−1.
Second, we assume that Ut+1 < Ut for τ ≤ t ≤ T − 1, and show that Uτ < Uτ−1. Let
m ≡ min{pτ−1e−qτ−1 , pτe−qτ} and m ≡ max{pτ−1e−qτ−1 , pτe−qτ}
Uτ−1 − Uτ = pτ−1e−qτ−1 yτ−1 + βδU1
1− β(1− δ) − pτe
−qτ yτ + βδU1




)− βUτ+1(1− pτe−qτ )+
≥ m yτ−1 − yτ
1− β(1− δ) +
+
(
1−m)β(Uτ − Uτ+1) > 0
where the last inequality stems from the induction assumption and productivity difference
if any.
53
Now, we turn to prove that wages always fall with unemployment duration. Consider
first the case in which the joint value ∆τ also falls. Then, the expected queue length qτ
must increase for the zero-profit condition (26) to hold in equilibrium. As all the terms in
the equilibrium wage equation (25) fall, so do wages. Consider now the case in which ∆τ
increases with unemployment duration. Then, equation (26) implies that qτ declines with τ .
Now, we can rewrite the zero-profit condition as k = η(qτ )
yτ−wτ
1−β(1−δ) . Since the second factor
on the right hand side must increase with τ because the first factor decreases. Proposition
2.3 establishes that yτ decreases and, hence, so must wτ for the ex-post profits to increase.‖
6.3 Constrained Efficiency in a Two-Period Model
We study constrained efficiency of the equilibrium allocation in the simplest economy com-
parable to the benchmark. We only describe those features that differ from the model set in
Section 2.
Consider an economy that lasts for two periods, t ∈ {1, 2}. A unit mass of risk-neutral,
unemployed workers are born every period. Unemployed workers are identified by a pair
(τ, i), where τ = 1 if short-term unemployed and τ = 2 if long-term unemployed. Index
i ∈ {`, h} stands for their market skills. A type i worker is suitable for any given job with
probability λi, with λh = 1 and λ ≡ λ` < 1. The market productivity of a type i worker
suitable for the applied job amounts to yi, with yh > y` = 0. A worker is born skilled with
probability µ ∈ (0, 1). Let uti(τ) denote the measure of unemployed workers of type (τ, i)
at the beginning of period t.51 We normalize home productivity to 0. Employment is an
absorbing state, i.e. δ = 0.
A worker who has been unemployed for τ periods expects to be suitable for the job in









The expected productivity of suitable type τ candidates in period t is determined by the











whereas the actual productivity of the selected applicant is instantaneously revealed upon
hiring.
51For notational consistency, u1i (2) = 0 for i ∈ {`, h}.
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6.3.1 First Period Search and Value Functions
For convenience, we omit the reference to the duration of unemployment, τ , and the state
variable u in the first period.
Firms post and fully commit to job offers. A job offer consists of a single wage w1
to be paid in each period. Let q denote the expected queue length at any given job. The
probability of filling the job is η1(q) = 1−e−q, whereas the job-finding probability conditional
on being suitable becomes ν1(q) =
η1(q)
q
. The actual job-finding probability, hence, refers to
the composite event of being suitable and being selected for the job, h1(q) = p1ν1(q).
The complementary slackness condition, counterpart of condition (9), is
U1 ≥ h1(q1(w1)) (w1(1 + β)− βU2(2)) + βU2(2)
and q1(w1) ≥ 0, with complementary slackness.
The value of a firm in period 1 is
V1(w1) = −k + η1(q1) (y1 − w1) (1 + β)
6.3.2 Second Period Search and Value Functions
As in the main model, firms can treat observationally different workers differently. Therefore,
contractual job offers in period two may stipulate wages contingent on expected productivity,
ω2 = {w2,τ}τ≤2. Each firm posting a job ω2 expects q2(ω2, τ ) suitable applicants of duration
τ . Let q2(ω2) ≡ (q2,1(ω2), q2,2(ω2)). We will omit the reference to ω2 unless necessary.
Because Proposition 2.3 holds also in this environment, firms discriminate against long term
unemployed workers in the hiring stage. Therefore, the probability of filling a job with a




τ ′<τ q2,τ ′
(
1− e−q2,τ )) .
The actual matching probability for a worker of duration τ is defined as h2,τ (q
2) = p2,τν2,τ (q
2),
where the conditional probability ν2,τ (q
2) = η2,τ (q
2)
q2,τ
. For each duration τ in period two,
U2,τ ≥ h2,τ (q2(ω2))w2,τ and q2,τ (ω2) ≥ 0, with complementary slackness,
The value of a firms in period two is








There are two resource constraints in this second period. First, the law of motion of
available labor resources is
u2i (2) = u
1
i (1) (1− λiν1(q1)) , ∀i ∈ {`, h}. (35)
Second, the mass of vacancies does not depend on the unemployment duration of appli-








µ+ λ(1− µ) (36)
6.3.3 Equilibrium
A symmetric directed search equilibrium consists of unemployment values U1, {U2,τ}, distri-
butions of unemployed workers ut ∈ [0, 1]2×2, wage contracts w1 ∈ [0, yh] and ω2 ∈ [0, yh]2,
and expected queue length functions Q1(·) : [0, yh]→ R+ and Q2 : [0, yh]2 → R2+, such that
firms maximize expected profits at contracts w1 and ω2, expected profits are zero, workers
search optimally, and the two resource constraints (35) and (36) hold.
Next, we characterize the equilibrium allocation. We solve out the firm’s profit-maximizing
problem subject to the optimal search behavior of job-seekers. Given the unemployment
value of workers, the firm’s problem (Pt) in period t becomes
(P1) maxq1,w1 η1(q1) (y1 − w1) (1 + β)
s. to q1U1 ≤ q1h1(q1)
(











s. to q2,τU2,τ ≤ q2,τh2,τ (u, q2)w2,τ
The following proposition establishes the existence of equilibrium as well as a unique
solution for the two firms’ problems. The proof is omitted.
Proposition 6.1 Given U1, {U2,τ}, problems (P1) and (P2) have a unique solution. Further-
more, second period firms find it optimal to employ workers of all unemployment durations.
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There exists a symmetric equilibrium.The equilibrium wages are
w1(1 + β) =
q1e
−q1












1− e−q2,2 y2,2 (39)
We now derive the private net returns of a vacancy in period one. To obtain the profits
that firms make in equilibrium, we substitute out the equilibrium wages into the firm’s value
function and the continuation value of unemployment U2,2. The expected discounted profits
are







The interpretation of expression (40) is straightforward. The first two terms amount to
the expected discounted output net of the vacancy cost. The remaining two terms are the
wage bill the firm incurs. The first part of these wage costs stands for the externality the
marginal firm creates on the other vacancies in period one, whereas the second one captures
the intertemporal effects on period-two firms. Free entry implies V ∗1 = 0 in equilibrium.
6.3.4 Constrained Efficiency
We argue that a benevolent social planner can improve upon the decentralized equilibrium.
It can be shown that the second period equilibrium allocation is constrained efficient, con-
ditional on an efficient entry of firms in the first period. This is not surprising because the
economy starting in the second period does not differ from Shi (2002) and Shimer (2005a)
conditional on the first period decisions. Since the inefficiency outcome results from the
dynamic externalities it suffices to show that the private and social gains of period-one firms
do not coincide with each other.
Having determined the profits of period-one firms in the previous section, we now turn to
the social planner problem. As is standard, given risk neutrality of the workers’ preferences,
the goal of the planner is to maximize total output net of recruitment costs. The planner sets
the mass of vacancies {vt}t and the hiring strategies given the heterogeneity in productivity
for each period. The planner is subject to the same constraints specified above for the
decentralized economy. First, as the planner cannot assign workers to jobs, coordination
frictions arise. Second, the planner faces the same incomplete information problem and
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has access to the same testing technology. Aiming to maximize output, the planner also













s. to vt =
µ+λ(1−µ)
qt,1
, and the resource constraints (35) and (36).
The following result follows. The proof is omitted.
Lemma 6.2 The social returns of the marginal vacancy in period one are













The first two terms stand for the expected output net of vacancy costs. The third term is the
standard negative externality on contemporaneous firms as they are less likely to fill their
vacancies. When comparing with expression (40) for the private returns, we see that this
effect is internalized in equilibrium as it is usually the case in directed search models. The
last term of expression (41) captures the reduction in the expected returns of period-two
firms. This intertemporal effect occurs through two channels that correspond to the two
addends within this last term. First, the intensive margin: posting one more vacancy affects
negatively the composition of the pool of unemployed and reduces the expected returns in
period two. Second, the extensive margin: the marginal firm reduces the mass of suitable
job-seekers in period two, making it more difficult to fill jobs in that period.
After some simplifications, the difference between the private and social returns of a
marginal vacancy becomes





































The next proposition is based on the fact that this difference is positive as the last term
between brackets is positive. Thus, there is excessive entry of firms in equilibrium. Fur-
thermore, notice that the efficient allocation can be implemented through a tax on the entry
cost, or equivalently on firms’ profits, equal to the amount in (42). The following proposition
states these results.
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Proposition 6.3 Constrained efficiency is not attained in the market economy. There are
too many vacancies in equilibrium. By implementing a tax on firms’ profits or a fee on
posting vacancies, the equilibrium allocation becomes constrained efficient.
6.3.5 Understanding the Inefficiency
To understand the inefficiency result, it is instructive to look at the two limit cases in which
unemployment duration becomes worthless information. If λ is either arbitrarily small or




and the first term of expression (42) becomes 0. That is, there are no composition effects
as either firms almost perfectly detect the skilled applicants, if λ ∼ 0, or the signal is barely
informative, if λ ∼ 1. In the latter case, i.e. when firms cannot detect unskilled workers, the
loss in period-two output due to the marginal increase of the mass of period-one vacancies
is neutralized by the increase in total output in period one. As a result, the equilibrium is
constrained efficient. Notice that, in this case, the setup does not differ from the standard
directed search model. In other words, symmetric incomplete information by itself does not
generate inefficiencies.
However, if the testing technology is almost perfect, λ ∼ 0, the equilibrium is still not
constrained efficient even though there are no efficiency losses on the intensive margin. The
inefficiency outcome results from the fact that the intertemporal effects on the extensive
margin are not totally captured by the equilibrium wages. When posting vacancies, the
planner looks at the expected number of suitable units of labor, whereas firms are subject to
the worker’s unemployment value constraint. The difference between these two economies is
captured by the last term of expression (42). If λ is arbitrarily close to 0, the first probability
within brackets of this last term is 1, whereas the second probability becomes strictly lower
than 1.
Put differently, in the directed search framework, competition comes from firms taking
the market value of workers as given, which amounts to the continuation value they can
obtain elsewhere. If firms perfectly learn the applicant’s type and, hence, unskilled workers
are not employable, the unskilled do not alter the applicants’ expected productivity, but
do affect their unemployment value. In contrast, the planner decision is not affected by
the unskilled as vacancy creation is determined by the number of effective working units.
Thus, firms in the market economy benefit from this asymmetry of information leading to
inefficiently low wages and an excessively large entry. Notice that the equivalent setting
to the planner’s problem would be a market economy in which there would be only skilled
workers. In this alternative world, both the planner and firms in the market economy would
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behave identically, and the last term of expression (42) would vanish.
For intermediate values of λ, the inefficiency result is due to the intertemporal external-
ities on both the intensive and extensive margins not captured by the equilibrium wages.
6.4 Calibration of the NR economy
In this Appendix, we report the results when calibrating the NR economy to the same
targets as used for the baseline calibration. The calibrated parameters are summarized in
the following table:
Table 4: Calibration of the NR economy
Parameter Description Value Target
Exogenously Set Parameters
β Discount factor 0.999 Annual interest rate of 5%
T LTU-defining duration 52 -
yh Productivity of skilled 1.0 (Normalization)
Jointly Calibrated Parameters
δ Job-separation rate 0.0032 Predicted monthly job-separation rate
k Vacancy cost 0.3888 13% avg. quarterly wage per hire
b Home productivity 0.4741 71% of avg. productivity
λh Skilled suitability prob. 0.3302 Avg. duration prior to E within next month
λ` Unskilled suitability prob. 0.0685 St. dev., skewness
µ Share of skilled 0.3551 and kurtosis of
y` Productivity of unskilled 0.4741 monthly exit rates
Compared to the results for the calibration of the ranking case shown in Table 1, the main
differences correspond to parameters k, b, and y`. In particular, y` is now much lower, while
the suitability parameters remain at similar levels. That is, once the ranking mechanism is
eliminated, larger productivity differences are necessary to match the duration distribution
of exit rates. On the aggregate level the calibrated parameters imply an unemployment rate
of 3.74%, a vacancy rate of 1.96%, and an average monthly exit rate of 26.68 %. As the
exit rates are directly targeted, these numbers are similar to the corresponding values of the
ranking economy.
The normalized exit rates and wages are compared in the following figure:
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Figure 7: Distributions over Unemployment Duration: Model and Data.
Note: Exit rates from unemployment are the transition rates from unemployment to employment within
the following month. Model callback rates are depicted in the left panel. Wages are the expected wage
conditional on being employed after four weeks. All values are normalized by the value at the first week.
The exit rates closely match the data. After 3 months, the fall in exit rates of the model
is 49% whereas it is 50% in the data. By construction, callback rates are flat in duration.
Wages, however, are declining much faster over duration: the fall after 3 months is 38%,
whereas it is 2.3% in the data (recall that wages are not targeted). The steep fall in wages
reflects the large difference in productivity over types and the segmentation of markets over
duration.
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